

Codeswitching in Campaigning Discourse: The Case of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian^{*}

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In this paper, I extend the study of codeswitching to the ever important, though oft neglected area of political discourse. I cite instances of Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian's codeswitching between Mandarin and Taiwanese in the 2001 legislative and city magistrate election, and I argue that this codeswitching is adopted as a conversational strategy for both pragmatic and strategic purposes. I demonstrate that codeswitching in political discourse is an interpersonal strategy that can be used to create, strengthen, or destroy interpersonal boundaries. In addition, it can also be used as a symbolic practice for practical and political purposes.

I adopt Rational Choice Models (RC) (e.g., Myers-Scotton 1993, Myers-Scotton and Agnes Bolonyai 2001) for analysis of codeswitching in political discourse; and I contend that, though most instances of codeswitching will reflect conventional expectations of language choice to a certain extent, speakers make rational individual choices. This is especially evident in political discourse, where a politician can rely on the ambiguities of the inference of a language choice to avoid alleged responsibility, redefine interpersonal boundaries, or take refuge in a different role. In short, a rational-based choice-model helps explain how a politician can use an array of language choices to maximize his personal/political gains and minimize personal/political risks.

It is further suggested that the inference of a codeswitch is indeterminate and ambiguous (Heller 1988). The ambiguity and indeterminacy of a code choice are especially important in political discourse where conflicts and confrontations are common and where indirectness and involvement are necessary. Thus, studying codeswitching in political discourse will, on the one hand, enhance our understanding of codeswitching in general from a specific genre, and, on the other hand, will also add to our appreciation of political discourse from a more specific sociolinguistic perspective.

Key words: codeswitching, political discourse, conversational strategy, language use

1. Introduction

Following Gumperz (1982a), Heller (1988), and Myers Scotton (1976), this paper treats codeswitching not only as an important part of the social mechanisms of negotiation

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and definition of social roles, networks, and boundaries (Heller 1988:1), but also proposes that it should be treated as an important but often ignored verbal strategy in political discourse with which one can achieve pragmatic and strategic functions without assuming the responsibility or the risk of being put on record (cf. Obeng 1997). A skillful politician can adopt an instance of codeswitching to achieve both tasks simultaneously by the inference of a codeswitch. The inference is generated beyond the semantic content of the sentence and can be canceled, calculated, or detached. Moreover, the inference of an instance of codeswitching can be achieved non-conventionally, i.e., by way of humor, slang, or analogy, and its meaning is non-determined since a single instance of codeswitching can give rise to several inferences in different communicational contexts. The discourse effects can further depend on the interlocutors' inference of inclusion, separation, solidarity, conventional usage of a code, and the shared understanding and expectations among interlocutors. In sum, much of what codeswitching can achieve as a conversational strategy, apart from the conventional meanings of a code, is derived from making inferences, which are further dependent on the context and the shared understanding and expectations of the interlocutors. Thus, by studying codeswitching in a political context, we are able to see how allegations are made or disclaimed, boundaries created or destroyed, and responsibilities assumed or avoided. Moreover, the increasing use of Taiwanese, as well as other non-official languages, though to a much lesser degree, by public figures such as the president, combined with the fact that these languages are used in public domains such as politics and the media, not only help raise the visibility but also the status of Taiwanese, which has been seen not only as "the language for Taiwan" by active pro-independence supporters, but also as "the language for Taiwanese" by "ethnic Taiwanese."¹ This kind of ethnic boundary-making can be adopted into political discourse, and the president's choice to alternate between Mandarin and Taiwanese in politics and the media can thus be seen as an interesting codeswitching case study, where we can learn how a symbolic power struggle between supporters of different ethnic groups can be performed and practiced through language choices.

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¹ According to Ian Buruma (1997:78-90), an East Asian specialist who has published widely on political development in Taiwan, the most powerful driving force propelling Taiwan's newborn democracy is not a rising standard of living, but a peculiar kind of nationalism, which pits those Chinese whose ancestors came to Taiwan over the past several centuries (i.e., ethnic Taiwanese, against those who fled to Taiwan from the mainland in 1949 (i.e., Mainlanders).

2. Literature review

To lay a theoretical groundwork for this paper, in this section we first review some of the major works on codeswitching and the theory of speech accommodation and indirectness.

2.1 Codeswitching

Codeswitching can be defined as “the use of two or more linguistic varieties in the same conversation or interaction” (Scotton and Ury 1977). A codeswitch might signal several things and scholars are still in disagreement over how and why people codeswitch (Li 1998). Earlier works on sociolinguistics treat codeswitching as a result of the linguistic inadequacy of the target language (Weinreich 1953). Gumperz (1982) states that, although codeswitching may indicate a lack of words in one language, it has also been observed in well-educated, bilingually proficient people. As interest in codeswitching has taken hold, many scholars have assumed a more positive attitude toward codeswitching and have proposed that a switch of codes might be an unintentional act, a conventional move to reflect a change of topic, participant, or setting, an indirect language usage to signal symbolic connotations such as authority, ethnic solidarity or identity, or a strategic tactic to redefine boundaries among speakers (Auer 1995, Gal 1998, Heller 1988, 1995, Scotton 1983, Scotton and Ury 1977).

Blom and Gumperz (1972) first proposed that the functions of codeswitching could be analyzed in terms of situational switching and metaphorical switching. Situational switching occurs when there is a change of participants, settings, or topics. A speaker’s change of codes reflects societal norms and a consensus among participants. In contrast, metaphorical switching is entailed when speakers use a code to convey not norm-based meaning but symbolic connotation, such as degree of involvement, objectiveness, or power struggle. Whereas situational switching reflects the conventional linguistic expectations and usage of a community, metaphorical switching allows speakers to tap into the contextualized meaning of a code in order to convey an oblique message. Gumperz and Hernandez-Chavez (1975) and Gumperz (1982) further propose a variety of rhetorical and stylistic functions of codeswitching. They range from signaling a distinction between direct and reported speech, to marking interjections and comprising sentence-fillers, to clarifying and emphasizing a message through codeswitched reiteration of utterance, to qualifying a message or structuring information. These findings have influenced many scholarly works, which have offered similar accounts of the types of functions of codeswitching. For example, Auer (1995) suggests that the juxtaposition of codes entails the juxtaposition of two semiotic systems; these can also

be seen as (at least) two different ways of organizing a worldview, symbolic and material resources, and cultural, economic, and political practices. Heller (1995) offers similar accounts and states that the juxtaposition of codes illuminates the relationship between institutional relations of power and those connected to forms of social organization in the broader society (Heller 1995:374).

Apart from explaining when and how speakers switch between languages, other scholars have tried to account for why codeswitching occurs. Scotton and Ury (1977), for example, rationalize that the act of codeswitching is a gesture to redefine identity boundaries or a calculation of rights and obligations of the speaker. They state that a speaker switches codes for the two following reasons: to redefine the interaction as appropriate to a different social arena, or to avoid, through continual codeswitching, defining the interaction in terms of any specific social arena. Codeswitching back and forth reflects the speaker's uncertainty concerning which social arena is the best ground on which to carry out the interaction with a view to the speaker's long-term and short-term goals (1977:6). Scotton (1972) suggests that when codeswitching occurs in intra-group exchanges, it can best be explained as the mechanism for the negotiation of respective rights and obligations of participants (1972:433). In sum, the core assumption of sociolinguistic accounts of codeswitching is still that members of a bilingual speech community attach different identities, rights, and obligations to each of their languages. Speakers who codeswitch are seen as evoking and laying claims to the rights, obligations, and identities associated with each language (Stroud 1992:131).

2.2 The Speech Accommodation Theory

According to Speech Accommodation Theory (SAT), proposed by Giles and Smith (1979), linguistic convergence is defined as a strategy whereby speakers adapt to another's communicative behavior in order to gain social approval. Linguistic convergence can further be classified into two types: upward convergence and downward convergence (Giles and Powesland 1975). A move toward a high variety is upward convergence, whereas a move toward a low variety is downward convergence. There are also occasions where speakers perform convergence in excess for various pragmatic purposes, and there thus results over-accommodation. SAT is important in providing some account of why speakers switch languages in a particular setting. They do so either to gain approval from the audience or to signal disapproval. As in the case of over-accommodation, we observe that some of the election campaigners who are neither fluent in nor even familiar with a particular code will strive to make a show of it, which often results in their making fools of themselves for the sake of gaining approval or in an attempt to break through an ethnic boundary, if only temporarily.

2.3 Codeswitching as an indirect speech feature in political discourse

As mentioned previously, one of the great strengths in adopting codeswitching, apart from its being a very useful conversational strategy where effective discursal and rhetorical effects can be achieved, is in its strategic ambiguities. The indeterminacy of a codeswitch can arise from several areas and since neither the speaker nor the hearer will have total authority over exactly what a code really means in a given context, the meaning of a codeswitch is negotiated indirectly in most cases. Speakers can tap into such semantic polyphony and adopt it for practical and political purposes. Because of the indeterminacy of the inference of an instance of codeswitching, we propose that it should be treated as an important indirect speech feature and that it should be given a status equal to other oblique speech features, such as allusions and metaphors, and thus its study should make an important contribution to political communication.

According to Obeng (1997), political interests and political necessity, as well as personal face-saving, motivate indirectness (1997:49). The indirectness may also be motivated by politeness (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987), since speakers do not always want to be put on record, especially when involved in sensitive issues or having to face complicated consequences. Besides escaping obligations and responsibilities, speakers can also adopt indirectness to achieve a sense of involvement that comes from being understood without saying what one means (R. Lakoff 1979). Tannen (1989) further argues that by requiring the listener or reader to fill in unstated meaning, indirectness contributes to a sense of involvement through mutual participation in sense-making (1989:23). Codeswitching, along with other indirect speech features, can help speakers achieve pragmatic and strategic purposes without revealing one's full intentions, posing threats to interlocutors, or claiming responsibility in a contested context. Scholars such as Obeng (1997), Chilton and Ilvin (1993), and Masci and Semino (1996) have studied indirect features such as metaphors and analyzed their pragmatic and strategic functions. Wei (2001a) studies the indirect usage in recent Taiwanese political discourse and notes that allusions and metaphors are among the most prevalent and pervasive linguistic strategies. However, codeswitching as an indirect speech feature receives relatively little attention in political discourse. Thus, we think the study of codeswitching in a political discourse should make an important contribution for political communication and sociolinguistics.

3. Language situation and language use in Taiwan

3.1 Language situation in Taiwan

According to a survey and other information released by the Taiwan government,

the Han are the largest ethnic group in Taiwan, comprising roughly 98 percent of the population. The Han in Taiwan are usually classified as two distinct groups: early Han Chinese immigrants, who are often referred to as “Taiwanese,”² and immigrants who moved to Taiwan with the Kuomintang (KMT) government in 1949, generally referred to as “Mainlanders.” The Taiwanese group comprises 85 percent of the Han population and is often subdivided even further into Hakka (mostly from Guangdong Province), and Southern Fujianese (primarily from China’s southeastern province of Fujian). The Fujianese outnumber the Hakka by approximately three to one. The second group, the Mainlanders, comprises slightly less than 15 percent of the Han population. Inter-marriage among all these groups is quite common, so the characteristics of each group grow less distinct with the passage of time (Huang 1993, P. Chen 1999).

The rise of Taiwanese and other non-Mandarin languages is due partly to the lifting of martial law in 1987 when the KMT government lifted the ban on political parties and loosened its control of the radio, television, and print media, among many other changes. Programs aired or printed in languages other than Mandarin would no longer be subjected to time limitations and *ad hoc* censorship. The use of non-Mandarin languages in public was no longer punished or restricted. In 1993, the teaching of non-Mandarin languages at elementary school levels was encouraged. Interest in learning and teaching non-Mandarin languages was aroused, and there was considerable discussion of curriculum design and implementations of mother tongue language teaching, and English teaching. As a result, the teaching of English and mother tongue languages was enforced and implemented at all elementary schools island-wide in 2001.

Many Taiwanese attempt to speak Taiwanese in public domains. Many Mainlanders who came to Taiwan during the 1940s and their descendants who are non-native speakers of Taiwanese attempt to speak Mandarin with a Taiwanese pronunciation (Chen 1996: 265). The media also plays an important role in prompting and reviving Taiwanese and other non-Mandarin languages. With more popular Taiwanese programs, songs, and catch phrases constantly repeated in the media, people are more accustomed to the use of Taiwanese in public domains.

Such a radical turnabout in language attitudes and policies has also revised the status of non-Mandarin languages, which had been treated as “non-standard” at best and associated with those of lower socio-economic status (Berg 1986, Chang 1996, Figueroa

² On October 25, 1998, Taiwan’s Retrocession Day, former president Lee Teng-hui first proposed the concept of the “new Taiwanese” to promote ethnic unity. Its highest ideal is to see further generations no longer discriminating between those whose ancestors came to Taiwan earlier and those who came more recently. The concept of the “new Taiwanese” still retains the principle that people in the Taiwan area are ethnically and culturally Chinese, but emphasizes the attachment of the people to their land (*Taiwan Year Book 2001*).

1988, Huang 1993, 2000, Tse 2000). Scholars have contrasted this new policy with the old one, i.e., exclusive use of the Mandarin language, as S. Chen (1999:3) pointed out: “the policy came about as a backlash against the strict imposition of the Mandarin language policy of the past. It was designed to implement mother tongue teaching in schools with the goal of repairing the decay of Taiwanese ethnic languages.”

Whereas some people see the relaxed language policy as an opportunity for the revitalization of non-Mandarin languages, others have taken a more drastic political stance. Feelings of resentment and inferiority, which had not been visible during the strict Mandarin policy, have found an outlet and even a platform. As Tse (2000) states, there was a trend toward the increased use of local mother tongues as a symbol of defiance against the establishment, as an expression of democratization, as a sign of localism, and as an assertion of ethnolinguistic identity. For quite a long time, language seemed to be a dividing force rather than a unifying one, increasing the social and psychological distance among the major ethnic groups (2000:161).

3.2 Democratization and language use

The rising power of the opposition political parties, especially the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was first organized in 1983 by a group of independents who sought self-determination for the Taiwanese people, democratic freedoms, the establishment of economic ties with China, and a multiparty system (*Encyclopedia Britannica Online*). The DPP members did not have an easy start before the lifting of martial law, during which time political radicals were seen as traitors and were subject to severe punishment. After the lifting, the DPP participated in the 1989 legislative and local elections, which were the first to allow non-Kuomintang (KMT) members to participate. It gradually established its power and influence from the grass roots up and soon had a steady stream of successes, gaining much support and eventually becoming the most powerful opposition party. With Chen Shui-bian winning the year 2000 election, the DPP has transformed itself into the ruling party. Opposition politicians are discovering that the choice of which language to use can be a tricky political act. In parliament, they have taken to questioning government officials in Taiwanese, knowing that some of the bureaucrats could not understand, simply to embarrass them (*Economist* August 7, 1993). The Taiwan dissidents who support the DPP are pushing for official acceptance of Southern Min, Hakka, and indigenous languages. Such critics provocatively refer to Southern Min as the “National Language,” and to Mandarin as “Beijing dialect” (Erbaugh 1995:85). According to Huang (2000), some of the DPP activists see the legitimization of Mandarin as the national language as having placed them at a serious disadvantage and put them in the category of second-class citizens vis-

à-vis the Mainlanders, who were already enjoying hegemony in the political sphere (2000:145). Erbaugh (1995) further states that Taiwan activists show exquisite sensitivity to mainland policy and now use it to goad the Taiwan government toward greater tolerance of and support for both Chinese dialects and indigenous languages. At the same time, unofficial forces, especially the increasing pride in local culture and the economic boom on the south coast, encourage bi-dialectalism more effectively than policy ever could (1995:79). In addition, speaking Taiwanese has become the prerequisite for candidates who want to mobilize voters and win elections. Even people who do not speak the language as their mother tongue will try to use it during election campaigning rather than risk being seen as “not one of the people” or losing the election.

In sum, in this section, we provide a sketch of the ethnolinguistic situation in Taiwan and discuss a series of democratic movements that chose Taiwanese and Hakka as a language of opposition to defy the authority of the KMT and the prestige of Mandarin. As the then-opposition parties led by the DPP gradually established themselves in power and became the ruling party when its candidate Chen Shui-bian became president in 2000, Taiwanese has been used and promoted by political activists to replace Mandarin as the “national language.” In recent years, non-Mandarin varieties have also become sought-after languages since Taiwanese, Hakka, and aboriginal languages are the unmarked varieties in areas other than Taipei. The authoritative vs. democratic poles, as well as south vs. north poles, between Mandarin and Taiwanese create constant tension and contention for their speakers.

4. Language use and symbolic power

Using Taiwanese or other Chinese languages as a potent tool to identify with the people is not a DPP innovation. Revolutionaries (such as Mao and Deng Xiaoping) have always taken pride in their heavy local accents, and many influential Chinese politicians (e.g., Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji) are fluent in more than one local tongue and use them to identify with the locals. Thanks to the relaxing attitude toward language policy in Taiwan since the late 1980s and increasing democratization, many a non-DPP member has either hired a speech coach or otherwise demonstrated a genuine effort at accommodation. Chang Hsiao-yen (grandson of Chiang Kai-shek), James Soong (former Taiwan governor), and Ma Ying-jeou (former Justice Minister and present Taipei Mayor) have all well publicized their efforts at speaking, or at least trying to learn, non-Mandarin languages. Their fluency and proficiency might never surpass that of native speakers (such as Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, who are champions in using Taiwanese local idioms and slang), but their efforts have won them sympathy and support.

The use and choice of which language to adopt is certainly a strategic one when it comes to political interests. Tse (2000) observes that during the 1996 presidential and vice-presidential races, all four vice-presidential candidates spoke Mandarin, though their political stances ranged from ultimate re-unification to eventual separatism. Their choice of Mandarin in a public domain such as TV debates reflected their intentions to win votes and to get their messages across rather than rallying for ethnic identification and division (2000:161-162). A similar case is found with the New Party, whose members are largely Mainlanders or sympathizers for reunification with China, which nevertheless conducted some of their call-in programs in Southern Min (*ibid*:162). The issue of which language to use and when, in order to either mend or break an ethnic boundary, thus requires much linguistic—as well as political—skill.

5. Chen Shui-bian and his socio-political predicaments³

Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election on the March 18, 2000, with 39% of the vote, a number wide enough to put the KMT out of the political limelight, yet too narrow to leave Chen with a mandate. As a “minority president” (*shaoshu zongtong*), Chen and his cabinet had to form a coalition government, with which many difficult tasks needed to be tackled, on both domestic and international fronts. The DPP hardliners have voiced increasingly nationalistic sentiments, with which Chen will try to strike a balance in order to retain his presidential neutrality and his partisan affiliation.

Chen has also had to prove that he can work with the KMT mainstream, many of whom still smart from their election losses, but are still a majority in the Legislative Yuan and control many island-wide business sectors. Above all, he has to prove to China, and to the rest of the world, that he can handle all the domestic issues, maintain national dignity and prosperity, and negotiate with China on terms and time frames that are acceptable to both sides.

These are no easy tasks for Chen, and he needs not only political skills but also linguistic skills to reduce frictions and placate opponents. Chen is good at inspiring enthusiasm, especially among blue-collar workers and the younger generation, with whom he can forge immediate bonds by using indirect speech features such as analogy, allusion, or metaphor; and he does it in Taiwanese. Unlike most heavyweight politicians in Taiwan, who tend to emphasize their foreign (especially, American) education and training, and impress the media and voters with their fluency in foreign languages (especially, English), Chen inspires with his can-do spirit, maverick style, and pride in a humble origins as a tenant farmer’s son, fighting his way up, first out of poverty, then

³ The following section is taken from Wei (2001b).

earning a law degree at National Taiwan University, and gradually establishing himself as a political superstar in the then-opposition party, the DPP.

He has been praised as a straight-A student, who has always out-studied and out-performed the rest of the class, and he was criticized by one of his former advisers, Hsu Chung-hsin, as being a “100% lawyer”. He is good at campaigning and is seen as one of the most popular politicians, especially among the younger generation who not only love rock concerts sponsored by the DPP during elections, but also clamor for the A-Bian doll, modeled after Chen as a cute and cuddly marketing gimmick. He is also known for his arrogance, ruthlessly mowing down opponents, making enemies and alienating friends (Cheng 2000). A country boy turned tough politician, Chen’s humble background, deep roots with his southern origins, and his zest to climb to the top of the social ladder has made some observers compare him with the American politician Al Gore. Greenfeld has remarked that, “he’s a Taiwanese Al Gore, and that’s part of his problem. He could do with a bit of Clintonian warmth and charm” (*Time* May 21, 2001). Like Gore, Chen is smart and slick at campaigning but he has problems connecting with those whose emotions and hearts are set on issues such as cross-strait ties and party realignment.

In addition to creating successes, Chen also knows how to face defeat and make a comeback. He was jailed in 1986 for libel; elected Taipei mayor in ’94 in the first direct election for the post; lost his second mayoral bid in ’98; and entered the 2000 presidential race and won. On the day of his defeat to Ma Ying-jeou for a second term as Taipei mayor in 1998, Chen cited of Churchill, who said “a great city is known for the people’s cruelty to their leader.” And like Churchill, who later made a comeback after a local election, Chen was preparing for his run for the presidency and finally won the 2000 election, which was the first time in Chinese history that an opposition party had won the presidency.

His ability to play to the media, to work with the crowd, to seize the moment and to relate to people from the working class is further evidenced in his autobiography, *The Son of Taiwan*. Chen is also one of the many Taiwanese politicians who are willing to take on more than one role to get the job done, at least in costumes during the campaign. He has been attired, most notably, as Superman, as a famous baseball player, and as a male impersonator of the Statue of Liberty. He quotes from the Bible, ancient Chinese texts, has referred to himself as Joshua, while anticipating the peaceful power transition from KMT to DPP. Inspired by other politicians whose daring Chen takes serious note of, he also compared himself to Nixon and Kim Tae Chung in handling cross-strait issues. Chen’s rhetorical strategies can further include switching from one dialect to another, for example, from Mandarin to Taiwanese, or by making reference to trendy roles in movies (such as *Titanic*, or *Superman*) and sports (especially baseball favorites),

or by using indirect speech such as allusion, analogy, and metaphor.

In short, Chen is a seasoned politician who not only has the political skills but also the linguistic skills to deliver messages, to work the crowd, and to seize the moment. Studying his rhetorical strategies should prove worthwhile to the understanding of how language and politics work together in Taiwan's increasing democratization.

6. Texts and discussion

In this section, we examine instances of Chen's switching between Mandarin and Taiwanese in the 2001 election. We first categorize these instances according to their pragmatic functions such as emphases, repetition, ease of communication, and message qualification. As we will see from the examples, most of these instances are in accordance with the principle of situational switching proposed by Gumperz (1982), which stresses that speakers modify their choice of codes according to macro-social factors such as topic, participants, and settings. In addition, we also want to use these examples to suggest that an instance of codeswitching can have multiple readings, which can derive from the symbolic meanings of a chosen code, such as "we-code," or "they-code", and the shared understandings and expectations among the interlocutors. Furthermore, such strategic ambiguities can serve the purposes of either boundary-leveling or boundary-maintenance in as highly a contested context as an election campaign. The polyphony of codeswitching can be best explained by a Rational Choice Model (RC) (Myers-Scotton and Bolonyai 2001) and can serve political purposes for inclusion or separation, when judged from either an intra-group or inter-group perspective. Still, a skilled politician can further make his linguistic choice and calculation appealing to the public when codeswitching is performed in the company of puns, slang, or catch phrases (*chengyu*).

7. Examples:⁴

7.1

chhiaN3-lang5 ui5 chiah , lan2 bo5 jim7-ho5 phian-kian3 kah seng5-kian3 ° kiat-koe2 li2 chit-ma2 iau3-lai5 **nng2 thou5 chhim kut8** , iau3-lai5 *****De-cun-jin-chi** °

Trans: “We do not have any prejudice in employing any officials. However, now they are going to bully me, to “get an inch but demand a yard.”

kong2 kin-a2-jit8 iong7 ah0 chit8 ko3 kok-bin5-tong2-chek tek lang5 , iau3-lai5 cho3 heng5-cheng3-iN7-tiuN2 , chiap-e7-lai5 i hi le tong2 , **kui8 oaN2 iau3 phong2 koe3-khi3** , hit si7 put-kho2-leng5 e5 tai7-chi3 ° me chiong-kiat hek kim , ***ruguo huan-tang-bu-huan-yao , ***na2-tioh8-ai3 soan2 leh ° (The example is taken from SETN TV News recorded on 03/31/89.)

Trans: “Saying they [the ruling party] use a person with a KMT background to be the prime minister, and now they want to take over completely. This is impossible. To terminate the corruption...” “If you only change the solution without changing the prescription, then why do we need an election?”

In the first example, Chen was talking to labor representatives and discussing his ideas on cooperation across party lines. At the same time, Chen was also criticizing the opposition KMT for being aggressively harsh on Chen’s cabinet member selections. In this example, we see three instances of change of code, the first occurring right after Chen used a Taiwanese slang expression **Nng2 thou5 chhim kut8** (lit. ‘plowing deep in soft soil’), which can be translated as “giving an inch, but demanding a yard.” Chen was criticizing the KMT for their aggressiveness and harshness aimed at his choice of cabinet members. Chen further emphasized this point by switching to Mandarin and using the catch phrase **De-cun-jin-chi**, which has a meaning similar to its Taiwanese counterpart. By making his point twice in both Taiwanese and Mandarin and in slang and a literary expression respectively, Chen is most likely trying to emphasize his criticism of the KMT. Chen later used indirect quotation and another Taiwanese slang expression, **kui8 oaN2 iau3 phong2 koe3-khi3** (taking over the entire bowl), to hint at

⁴ For the data analysis and transcriptions, we use three stars to indicate a switch in code. Utterances in Taiwanese are underlined while those in Mandarin are not. Mandarin examples are transcribed in Pinyin and the Taiwanese in Church Romanization. The author also adopts the Mandarin-Taiwanese Translation System provided by Professor Chen Xing-xi at the Department of Information Science of National Taiwan University to transcribe the Taiwanese examples. Special use of homonymy, puns, slang, and catch phrases (*chengyu*) are in boldface.

the KMT's suspicion of Chen's ambition to replace the entire cabinet with his allies. What is interesting is that Chen not only used an oblique quotation to point out the criticism of the opposition, but he responded to such criticism by first pointing out the KMT's Achilles' heels—black gold, i.e., corruption and organized crime—then he switched to a literary phrase in Mandarin, **huan-tang-bu-huan-yao** (changing the solution without changing the prescription), ending with a rhetorical question in Taiwanese to qualify his message. His later switch to the Mandarin literary phrase can have two interpretations: first, it is difficult to find an equivalent in Taiwanese, and second, we think that the use of the Mandarin literary phrase has a metaphorical meaning, since here the topic, participants, and settings remain the same, but Chen switched to Mandarin, a code that symbolizes officialdom and authority, to express his determination.

7.2

ruhe lai chaoyue dangpai qijian, ningju chaoye gongshi , jiangshi jue ding shizheng chengbai de guanjian 。 ***chhut-kok piaN3 goa7-kau , teng5-lai5 beh piaN3 keN-che3 。 goa2 siong-sin3 put chi2-si7 teng5-lai5 piaN3 keN-che3 , ma7 me1 piaN3 ni5-be2 。 a piN2 ah choat8-tui3 e5-kah tak8-ke che2-iouN7 hap8-lit8 it-khi2 , ia7 choat8-tui3 choan5-sim choan5-lit8 hou7 i theN-e7-khi3 。 (Speech made on 06/05/90. SETN News. Chen was lunching with DPP legislators, expressing his concerns and determination to improve the economy and to win the December election.)

Trans: How to overcome partisan ideologies, solicit a consensus between the ruling party (DPP) and the opposition parties will be key to the success of the government's performance. *** (I) go abroad to strive for foreign affairs; (I am) back to strive for economics. I believe that I came back not only to strive for economics but also for the end-of-the-year (election). A-bian will definitely work together with everybody and will hang on whole-heartedly for sure.

In the second example, Chen first stated his pressing agenda in Mandarin, i.e., overcoming partisan ideologies and soliciting a consensus between the ruling party and the opposition parties. His choice of Mandarin can be explained by the nature of the statement, which is authoritative, official, and should be understood by people with or without any political affiliation. Mandarin as the national language certainly helps him achieve the aforementioned functions. Later, when he stressed his ambition and determination to improve the economic situation and to win the end-of-the-year election,

he switched to Taiwanese, which functions as the “we-code” among the DPP members, and his choice further helps solidify morale and gain access to group membership.

7.3

a piN2 ah , kam2-sia7 lan2 tak8-ke e5 phah-piaN3 , ia7 kam2-sia7 lan2 kok-ui7 e paN2 piaN3 . chong2-si7 , ***zongyou yitian dengdao ni . ***teng2 chap8 ji7 tang tan2-kau3 , piau2-si7 siaN-pi ? piau2-si7 lan2 chi2-iau3 u7 li2-siong2 , lan2 u7 bok8-phiau , poe7 hong3-ki7 , chhiu2-ho2 lan2 it-teng7 e7-hiau2 seng5-kong , tio3-m-tio3 ? (The example is taken from Chen’s 11/04/01 campaign speech in Changhua, TVBS News. Chen thanked the audience for their patience and hard work and he pointed out the twelve-year-long wait to get into the WTO.)

Trans: A-bian appreciates everybody’s efforts. I also thank you all for your hard work. After all, ***“(We will) finally reach you one day.” ***We have waited for twelve years. What does this mean? This means that as long as we have an ideal or a goal, and we never give up, we will succeed in the long run. Right?

In this example, Chen’s switch to Mandarin is to introduce a quotation, which is the title of a popular song and has been used by many people on various occasions. To say it in Mandarin not only lends authenticity, but also attracts attention. Further, Chen emphasized the long wait by uttering a paraphrase in Taiwanese in the following sentence and he ended with a rhetorical question, “What does this mean?” We think his switch between Mandarin and Taiwanese in this instance informs the pragmatic functions of lending authenticity, making a quotation, getting attention, and stressing important issues.

7.4

kok-bin5-tong2 tioh8-si7 chit-ma2 kok-hoe7 e5 te7 it toa7 tong2 , chai7-ia2-tong2 ka-khi2-lai5 saN-hun-chi-ji7 e5 sek8-chhu3 , chit-ma2 iu7 te7 kong , iu7-koh ka7 i koe3-poaN3-sou2 , lan2 cha2 chiu7 ka7 i koe3-poaN3-sou2 ah , kiat-koe2 , ***you zenmeyang ? ***chiong lan2 e5 i7-soan3 sat-tiau7 , che2 si7 tui3 lan2 PheN5-ou5 lang5 , tui3 lan2 li5-to2 , choe3 toa7 e bu2-jiok8 . (Chen gave this speech on 11/05/01 at Penghu Island (ERA News), where he criticized the opposition party legislators’ boycotting of the budgets at the congress.)

Trans: KMT has the majority in the Congress. The opposition parties make up two-thirds of it. Now (they) are saying that (we should) make their seats exceed half. We’ve made their seats exceed half long ago. ***And, so what? *** (They) cut our budget. This is the greatest insult to us Penghu people, to us off-island people.

In this example, Chen used Taiwanese in most junctures with the exception of “so what?” where he switched to Mandarin and dropped both of his hands when saying it. There are several interesting points in this instance: first, Chen’s choice of Taiwanese is seen as accommodating the audience. His attempt to gain membership with the audience is further evidenced in the last junctures of the example, where he used the inclusive first person plural pronoun “us/we” (lan2), while implying that the people who are the majority in the Congress and who boycotted the budget are “they”. Notice that in Chen’s first usage of “we” (lan2), we can have more than one readings of who “we” can refer to. That is, “we” can mean the voters who elected the KMT as the majority at the Congress, who are not necessarily from Penghu; or it can refer to the audiences, who have elected the KMT legislators. Although there are ambiguities in who “we” are, the audience should be pretty clear about the implied “they”—the majority at the Legislative Yuan⁵. Chen’s switch to Mandarin can be interpreted as attention getting, since he did so after he just finished a statement. Moreover, in reviewing a videotape of this speech, we saw that he dropped both his hands while asking “so what?” in Mandarin, and this paralinguistic evidence informed us that Chen was also making an indirect negative comment by way of asking a semi-tag question in Mandarin. In his later utterance, the symbolic boundary we/they is concealed syntactically, since in Chinese, at least in conversation, it is not required that the subject position be filled, so long as the interlocutors can identify the agent from the context. Thus, Chen not only chose Taiwanese to identify with the audience, but also simultaneously drew a symbolic boundary between “we” (Chen/the people on Penghu) and “they” (the legislators who boycotted the budgets). In sum, the analyses of this example inform us that a switch of code can signal the speaker’s intention to redefine boundaries, to gain membership, to get attention, and to make indirect negative comments.

7.5

a piN2 ah , u7 ki-hoe7 cho3 Tai5-pak-chhi7 chhi7-tiuN2 , chai7 Tai5-pak a piN2 ah
ia7 seng5-lip8 ji7-ji7-poeh ki3-liam7-koan2 , ji7-ji7-poeh ho5-peng5 kong-hng5 , put-
chi2 chiam-tui3 ji7-ji7-poeh , chiam-tui3 koe3-khi3 peh8-sek e5 khiong2-pou3 , a
piN2 ah ma7 seng5-lip8 peh8-sek-khiong2-pou3 ki3-liam7-pi , lan2 hi-bong7 kong2 ,
 ***muqin buzai kuqi , muqin zai wanshang buzai kuqi⁶ , meiyoun zuqun zhifen ,
 meiyoun Shengji zhibie , meiyoun chaoye de butong 。 Women ai zheyikuai tudi , women

⁵ After the 2001 election, the DPP obtained a majority in the Legislative Yuan. The KMT lost its mandate in the Legislative Yuan race.

⁶ Chen was quoting the sentence inscribed on the White Terror Monument on Green Island, where the original was “During that era, many mothers spent nights crying for their children locked up on Green Island.”

ai Taiwan , women buyao you zhengfu puohai , women buyao you renhe de baise kongbu , dui bu dui ? (Chen made this speech at Jiayi on 11/08/01, ERA News. He mentioned that he had authorized the establishment of the 2/28 Memorial Museum, the 2/28 Peace Park, and the Monument of White Terror while serving as Taipei Mayor from 1994 to 1998. He later stressed his goals of transcending ethnic boundaries, of avoiding clashes between ruling and opposition parties, and of getting rid of government persecution.)

Trans: A-bian had the chance to be the mayor of Taipei. A-bian (helped) put up the Memorial Museum of the 2/28 Incident⁷ and the 2/28 Peace Park.⁸ (These are done) not only for the 2/28 Incident, but also for the white terror⁹ in the past. A-bian also (helped) put up the Monument of White Terror.¹⁰ We hope that mothers cry no more, mother cry no more at night. (There will be) no division among ethnic groups, no division between Mainlanders and Taiwanese, and no division between the ruling party and the opposition parties. We love this land. We love Taiwan. We want no more persecution from the government. We want no more white terror. Right?

In this example, Chen started his speech by letting the audience in Jiayi, know what he had contributed to and endorsed for the democratization process during his tenure as Taipei mayor. His choice of Taiwanese can be seen as a symbolic convergence with the audience and we further interpret this act of identity as his gaining

⁷ The Incident began on February 28, 1947, after personnel of the Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Bureau beat a female vendor for illegally peddling cigarettes. Crowds attacked the Bureau's offices, and the resulting crackdown provoked island-wide riots that resulted in heavy casualties. The violence gradually subsided after Taiwan governor Chen Yi launched a "clean-up" campaign on March 20 of that year (*Central Agency News*, 02/26/01).

⁸ The 2/28 Peace Park (*er-er-ba heping gongyuan*) was established in 1995. Ex-president Lee Teng-hui made a public apology at the opening ceremony to the victims of the 2/28 Incident and to their families. In the same year, the legislature passed the proposal to make compensation to the families of the victims of the 2/28 Incident. The Administrative Yuan established a foundation to solicit funds and support.

⁹ "White Terror" refers to the tight control of the KMT over Taiwan when it first took over the island in the late 1940s. There had been a series of events and statutes, which began in 1949-50 when the ROC declared martial law and enacted the Measures to Eradicate Espionage during the Period of Communist Rebellion and ended with the repeal of martial law in 1987. During that period, many were jailed after being falsely accused of crimes or practicing civil disobedience (*Sinorama*, 07:1997, Taipei, Taiwan).

¹⁰ Completed in 2000 on Green Island, where many victims of the White Terror had been jailed, the monument is a special memorial to the victims and aims to transcend sadness and the sense of tragedy. It is also the site of Asia's first monument to human rights (*ibid*).

approval from the audience. As we mentioned in section 3, democratization in Taiwan is in step with a relaxation of language policy and the rise of Taiwanese and other ethnic languages, such as Hakka and the aboriginal languages. The then opposition party, the DPP, had used Taiwanese while engaging in debates and arguments with members of the legislative Yuan and demanded compensation and rights at various protests and sit-ins. In this context, Taiwanese can be seen as “the language for democratizing movements.” Thus, it is not surprising Chen described his efforts in Taiwan’s democratization in Taiwanese, especially in places such as Jiayi, where the first 2/28 Incident Monument was established, and where Taiwanese is the unmarked choice. Chen later switched to Mandarin when he started listing his goals of transcending partisan ideologies, overcoming ethnic boundaries, and eliminating government persecution, which was witnessed during the 2/28 Incident and evident during the enforcement of martial law (from 1945-1988). His choice of an unmarked code in this instance is intended to reach out to a broader audience, i.e., not only to his audience in Jiayi, but also to the people of Taiwan, regardless of their ethnic background or partisan affiliation. He is seen trying to bridge the ethnic boundary by choosing Mandarin, which is the national language and a symbol for ethnic integration at this point.

7.6

chong2-si7 bi7-lai5 ji7 tang poaN3 , a piN2 ah ke3-siok8 cho3 chong2-thong2 ,
 ***rang a-bian bu haozuo , dajia jiu bu haoguo 。 ***bi7-lai5 ui5-liau2 beh hou7 a
 piN2 ah ho2 cho3 , tak8-ke ho2-ke3 , chiu7 iau3 chi-chhi5 a piN2 ah , chi-chhi5 bin5-
 chu2-chin3-pou7-tong2 , ho7 bin5-chu2-chin3-pou7-tong2 seng5-ui5 kok-hoe7 te7 it
 toa7 tong2 , a-ne ho2-m-ho2 ? (Chen at Jiayi on 11/08/01, ERA News.)

Trans: After all, in the coming two and a half years, A-bian will continuously be the President. If you leave A-bian in difficulty, you all will live in difficulty. In order to make A-bian work easily and make you all live easily in the future, you must support A-bian, support the DPP, and make the DPP the No. 1 party in the Congress. All right?

In this example, Chen first chose the unmarked code to identify with the audience. He later chose the marked code, Mandarin, and used a slogan-like phrase with rhymes and parallel construction to make a point of his being besieged by the opposition parties. It is interesting to point out the paralinguistic information provided by the video clip of this speech. We heard two heavy drumbeats and a pause when Chen uttered this phrase. Within this context, we think that Chen’s switch to Mandarin not only serves to qualify his previous message—*he has been the president and will be the president for the next*

two and a half years—but also to escalate the conflict between himself and the opposition parties. Furthermore, as in example 7.4, he is making an indirect threat, emphasizing what he has been through and the consequences of the continuation of his besieged situation.

7.7

u7 chit8 tiau5 i7-soan3 , ge5 siu-jip8 hou7 song3-hiong-lang5 e5 kiaN2-li5 , heng3-kian3 thok-ji5-sou2 hou7 in kiaN2-li5 , kai2-sian7 siat-pi7 , phian-liat8 che7-chio2 nia7-nia7 ? neng-pek chap8-chhit ban7-it chheng goan5 , a-ne ma7 sat ? ***gewei zaiye , zai zenmeye , zenme neng shandiao women de jiaoyu yusuan ? zenme neng shandiao women de fuli yusuan , dui bu dui ? (Chen at Jiayi on 11/08/01, ERA News.)

Trans: “There was a budget for the children of lower-income families, to build child-care centers and to improve facilities. How much did it list? \$2,017,1000. How could they cut it? Those people in the opposition parties (pronounced the same as “barbarous”), however barbarous you are, how could you cut our education budget? How could you cut our budget for social welfare? Right?”

In this example, the polysemous *ye*, which can mean either the opposition or barbarous, is employed and is further incorporated in Chen’s choice of Mandarin. His switch to Mandarin might reflect his intention to get attention and to escalate the conflict between himself and the opposition parties, which is further evidenced by the two interrogative sentences: “How can they cut the education budget?” and “How can they cut the welfare budget?” The two interrogative sentences can also signal his frustration at the budget cuts and thus serve as indirect negative comments. Lastly, Chen’s use of a tag question at the end of this speech, serves both as a confirmation of his previous questions and to elicit attention and response from his audience.

7.8

cheng3-tong2 lun5-the3 chi-au7 , che si7 te7 it pai2 choan5-kok-seng3 e5 tai7-soan2 , ***women shi wanzhen de ! (Chen made this campaigning speech at I-lan on 11/09/01, ERA News. He stressed the importance of the up-coming election.)

Trans: After the alternation of the political parties, this is the first national election campaign we have. We are very serious.

In this example, Chen tapped into the officialdom and authority of Mandarin and used it to qualify the message and to express his seriousness. His switch to Mandarin at

the end of the sentence can also be interpreted as an attempt to get the audience's attention.

7.9

ui7-sim7-mih a piN2 ah phaiN choe3 ? chit8 ni5 goa7 lai5 tioh8-si7 ***chu-xin-ji-lü ,
yaoba a-bian laxialai , bu chengren a-bian shi zongtong , mei banfa jieshou a-bian shi
dajia xuanchu lai de zongtong , ***bun7-te5 chiu7 chhut te7 chia , but8 un7-tong7-ka
e5 cheng-sin5 , but8 bin5-chu2 e hong-hoan7 , sou2-i2 lin2 bat bun7-te5 e5 koan-
kian7 te-da2 . (Chen made this campaigning speech in Yunlin 11/12/01. He complained
 that the opposition parties have been boycotting him, refusing to accept that Chen has
 been elected president. ERA News.)

Trans: Why has A-bian worked with difficulty? For more than one year, they have
 been seeking every opportunity to pull A-bian down. They do not acknowledge A-bian
 is the president. They cannot accept A-bian is the president that you all elected. This is
 the problem: they have no sportsmanship; they have no style of democracy. So you
 know what the key point of the problem is.

In this example, Chen started his speech with the unmarked language, Taiwanese,
 since Yunlin, a county in the southern Taiwan, has a large population of Taiwanese-
 speaking voters. His later switch to Mandarin was begun with a Mandarin literary
 phrase “**chu-xin-ji-lü**,” which can be roughly translated as “working very hard,” or
 “seeking every opportunity.” There is no Taiwanese equivalent to this phrase and
 Chen's switch to Mandarin at this juncture can be explained as using a Mandarin phrase
 to support his point. But Chen did not stop at this phrase. He went on with Mandarin to
 criticize the opposition parties for not acknowledging Chen as president and to
 condemn them for not accepting Chen as an elected president. Under this context, his
 usage of Mandarin serves to escalate the conflict between himself and the opposition
 parties.

7.10

khioh2 pun-soe2 khioh-tioh8 Tai5-pak-koan7 , lan2 u7-kau3 chheng-khi3 , m7-thang
chai3 khioh2 pun-soe2 , tio3-m-tio3 ? lan2 si7 te7 soan2 chhi7-tiuN2 , m7-si7 te3 ho
lang5 ***zuo fan-lan-jun de zuhe , ***m7-si7 beh choe3-lang5 e5 ***bai-lao-shu ,
***cho3 chit8 ko3 cheng3-tong2 kiat-hap8 tek sit8-giam7-tiouN5 . a piN2 ah pai3-thok
toa7-ka , ***women jujue zuo bai-lao-shu , ***gun2 beh soan2 ho2 koan7-tiuN2 sou-
cheng-chhiong , tio3-m-tio3 ? (Chen's campaign speech made on 11/16/01, where he
 spoke in Taipei county. Chen was trying to lobby votes for the incumbent county chief

Su Zhen-chang while criticizing Su's chief opponent, Wang Chien-shiuan, a New Party nominee, who also won support from the KMT and the People's First Party. ERA News)

Trans: He (Wang Chien-shiuan) came to Taipei County to pick up trash.¹¹ We are very clean and we do not need to pick up trash, right? We are voting for a mayor, not to give a chance to the organization of the pan-blue¹² alliances, not to be a genuine pig for others, not to be a laboratory of hotchpotch political alliances. A-bian asks you all that we refuse to be a genuine pig. We will vote for the good county chief Su Zhen-chang.

In this example, Chen switched to Mandarin three times in his campaign speech in Taipei County, where the default language is Taiwanese. The first switch is a new political coinage, *fan-lan-jun de zuhe* (pan-blue alliance), which refers to the cooperation among the KMT, the New Party (NP), and the People First Party (PFP). Chen was backing the DPP incumbent, Su Zhen-chang, and criticizing Su's tough challenger, Wang Chien-shiuan, the NP candidate who had also won the endorsement from the KMT and the PFP. The fact that Wang got an endorsement and support from the opposition parties was a threat for Su, since the polls showed that Wang and Su remained close, within 2% of each other. Chen's first switch to Mandarin can be explained as the lack of a proper equivalent in Taiwanese. Second, Chen switched to Mandarin for similar reasons, for he refers to the *fan-lan-jun de zuhe* (pan-blue alliance) as *bai-lao-shu* (a laboratory of hotchpotch political alliances), and urged the audience not to take part in it. Lastly, Chen switched to Mandarin again in order to reiterate his point of not taking part in the pan-blue hotchpotch alliance by repeating that "we refuse to be a genuine pig." Thus, his last switch to Mandarin can be explained as the lack of an equivalent in Taiwanese and as a reiteration of the previous point.

7.11

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo burang women miaoli lizizheng chuxi , ***chit8 tiouN ho2 pai5 pian3-seng5 a piN2 ah beh lia-khi3 tai , chin u7 chha hia che7 ? (Miaoli campaigning, responding to the criticism over Chen's APEC representative handling, 10/27/01 ERA News)

¹¹ Wang has emphasized that he wants to run a "clean" election; i.e., his campaign will not litter the streets with flags, slogans, or banners, behavior which most other candidates take for granted.

¹² The color blue is associated with the KMT, yellow with the New Party, and Orange with the People First Party. All three opposition parties have been trying to form alliances in order to win the election.

Trans: the PRC (People's Republic of China) won't let us Miaoli adviser Li attend (APEC), ***a good card was turned into A-bian's capital punishment. Did it really make that much difference?

In this example, Chen was responding to criticisms over his handling of China's rejection of Chen's appointed candidate, Li Yuan-Cu, who is a retired former vice-president of the 21 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summits, held in Shanghai. Taiwan participated in the meetings of the 21 APEC economies as Chinese Taipei. But due to Beijing's opposition, Taiwan's APEC representation has been limited to a cabinet minister or business leader (06/06/01, CNN Asia Edition). Chen's choice of Li was considered by Beijing as inappropriate because Li is not a business leader and because of his "official" status as a former vice-president (10/14/01 BBC News). Chen decided to boycott this rejection and declined to send an alternative representative. The opposition parties, however, interpreted Chen's handling of this issue as playing up to the antagonism between Beijing and Taipei at the expense of sacrificing Taiwan's future in order to raise his and the DPP's popularity for the 2001 December election (10/21/01 *China Times*, Taipei). Given this context, Chen's choice of Taiwanese certainly serves to attenuate the seriousness of the presumption and the ramifications of his handling of the APEC representative issue. This is accomplished by Chen's choosing an unofficial code, a "we-code" among the audience, thereby permitting him to avoid the rights and responsibility of his official status as the president and allowing him access to membership with the audience. Furthermore, by turning himself into the victim who is about to be killed (as opposed to the person who has made an important decision and who should be responsible for its consequences), Chen's choice and use of Taiwanese also served as a plea for sympathy. His next sentence, "Is it really that serious?" further indicates his intention to play down the accusations from the opposition parties and make a plea for acceptance and understanding. Codeswitching from Mandarin to Taiwanese constitutes claims on the acceptance of one group, i.e., the audience at Miaoli, and avoidance of responsibilities and obligations of another group, i.e., Chen's official status as the president and the politicians who criticized him. In sum, his switch to Taiwanese is ambiguous, but such ambiguities are well calculated and rationally based, given the contested nature of the context and the risks and responsibility he has to face if an alternative choice were made. Chen's choice of Mandarin in the first part of the sentence and Taiwanese in the second, interpreted under the Rational Choice Model (RC), depends on his estimation of what choices can offer him the greatest benefit. It is a calculated linguistic move, which reflects his goal to escalate conflict between him and opposition parties or the Chinese authorities, to enhance interpersonal relationships (i.e., between Chen and his supporters), to increase

psychological rewards (i.e., transforming himself from policy-maker to innocent victim) and decrease risks (i.e., minimizing chances of being interrogated by the press). The RC model further sheds light on the speaker's ability to employ a marked choice to pursue a complex set of goals and maintain multiple-role relationships (Myers-Scotton and Bolonyai 2001:20).

7.12

kok-ui7、kok-ui7，iau2-u7 it ui7，iau2-u7 chit8 ui7-chai7 po3-choa2 tian7-si7 u7 khoaN3-tiu3，te7 kong2 siaN2-mih oe7，i kong2 ***wo meiyu luoxuan, qunian sanyue bahao wo meiyu luoxuan wo shi bei zuodiao de，***li2 beh thiaN kui2 pian3? ***gewei, ta meiyu luoxuan ma? Ta you mei you luoxuan? Ta you mei you luoxuan? (Chen made this campaign speech in Jiayi where he criticized James Soong (the 2000 presidential candidate and chairperson of the PFP) for blaming his defeat on being framed. 10/27/01 ERA News.)

Trans: Everybody, everybody, there is another one, another one who you have either read from newspaper or seen (him) from TV. What did he say? He said: "I didn't lose. On March eighth of last year, I didn't lose. I was framed." How many times do we have to listen to this? Everybody, didn't he lose? Did he lose? Did he lose?

In this example, Chen used the unmarked language, Taiwanese, and the marked language, Mandarin, interchangeably. He started the speech in Taiwanese, asking the audience if they were aware of one of the presidential candidates in the 2000 election, who claimed that he (James Soong) had not lost; instead, he had been framed (by the KMT). Chen quoted Soong's speech in Mandarin, and this has at least two stylistic effects: 1) to quote James Soong's speech authentically, since James Soong has been considered a *waishengren*, or Mainlander, whose uses Mandarin in most situations; 2) to offer variation and contrast in the speech so that Chen can attract the audience's attention; 3) to escalate a confrontation and to convey Chen's dismay at James Soong's statement, which is further evidenced from the paralinguistic information on the video clip, where Chen dropped both of his hands when making this utterance. Moreover, Chen's distress is evidenced from the next two sentences where he repetitively asked "Didn't he lose (the presidential election)?" twice in Mandarin, while pointing his fingers at the audience and soliciting positive answers. The confrontation finally reached its peak when Chen repeated the last question again to the audience and we heard the audience say "Yes!" on the video clip.

8. Conclusions and suggestions

In this paper, I have tried to extend the study of codeswitching to an oft-neglected discourse—the political campaign. By using Chen Shui-bian's campaign speeches in the 2001 election as a source, I am able to demonstrate that, other than achieving pragmatic functions, codeswitching in political discourse can also serve as a disclaimer of performance, which further aids the speaker to either avoid responsibility, escalate confrontation, or transform into other roles. These symbolic acts of identity can be achieved because of the indeterminacy of codeswitching. In addition, by adopting the Rational Choice Model, I have demonstrated how this model helps a politician make rational choices from an array of languages in order to maximize benefits and minimize risks. I have provided evidence that, in this paper, Taiwanese, the vernacular language, the language spoken by the majority population in Taiwan, especially in southern Taiwan, and the language long used by the erstwhile opposition party, the DPP, is used by Chen not only to create socio-pragmatic discursal effects, but also used for boundary making (ex. 7.1, 7.2), and for taking refuge in order to disclaim performance and escape responsibility and obligations as well (ex. 7.11). Chen uses Mandarin, the official language, the language chosen by the KMT for administration, education, and other public domains, and the *lingua franca* for people in Taiwan when there is a lack of equivalence in Taiwanese (ex. 7.1, 7.10), when he wants to attract attention and lend authority (ex. 7.3, 7.6, 7.8), when he tries to escalate conflicts or make indirect negative comments (ex. 7.4, 7.7, 7.9, 7.12), and when he tries to level ethnic boundaries (ex. 7.5).

Second, our data and analyses also indicate that Chen's increasing use of Taiwanese in public domains is in accordance with the changing socio-political positions between Taiwanese and Mandarin. As the DPP became the ruling party after their victory in the 2000 presidential election, the president, as well as other officials and politicians, have used Taiwanese in public speeches and for official functions. Such linguistic practice not only helps elevate the status of Taiwanese but to some extent also challenges the status of Mandarin. Although we have not seen any specific proposal for revising the official language status of Mandarin, we have already seen a much more relaxed language policy toward the implementation of Taiwanese and other vernacular languages and we can reasonably expect that the use of Taiwanese and other vernacular languages will only encroach onto all public domains in the near future.

Third, the meaning of a codeswitch is not determined *a priori* and we need to rely on the socio-political context where the language choice takes place to help us with the inferences and interpretation. We have proposed and demonstrated that the strength of codeswitching is in the indeterminacy of its meaning. Choosing either Mandarin or Taiwanese, judging from either intra-group or inter-group perspective, an inference of

codeswitching can serve as either boundary-leveling or boundary-making in political discourse. Moreover, we have also seen that in most of our examples, a switch can signal more than one reading. By providing the contextual information, we are able to disclose the dynamics and richness in analyzing acts of codeswitching. As we have demonstrated, Chen's linguistic performance not only serves conversational and discursive but also political purposes. Studying codeswitching in a political context, then, can help us better understand the interaction between politics and language choices.

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台灣政治論述中的「符碼轉換」使用： 以陳水扁總統助選語言為例

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近年來，台灣許多政治人物在公開場合發表談話中常將國語、台語交互使用，這種將不同語言互用的現象，在語言學上稱為「符碼轉換」(codeswitching)。過往的研究顯示，「符碼轉換」為一重要溝通策略 (conversational strategy)，多出現在所使用之主要語言缺乏適當表達之詞彙；為充分表達內容之透切性及加強重複表達語氣時候，具有發揮談話策略運用之功能。另一方面，若是夾用較弱勢語言談話，則可爭取弱勢族群認同或表達說話者親切度與幽默感等。然而過往之研究範圍僅限於一般會話、書面文件或報紙標語，對於目前台灣政治人物交錯使用政治性談話雙語策略並無系統之研究。

本文主要採用質化研究方法及文獻分析，同時論證陳總統之轉換使用語，一方面可有效運作為講話策略工具，並展現經由語言轉換使得政治性談話具有溝通技巧，加深選民認同感及族群意識。另一方面也有可能產生加深族群間的藩籬、暗批對手或諷刺時政。

關鍵詞：符碼轉換，政治論述，溝通策略，語言使用