Evidentials in Amdo Tibetan

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In certain languages of the world, the verb is obligatorily marked with a special semantic category which designates the information-source on which the speaker's assertions are based. Since evidentiality, the generally accepted

- The Amdo Tibetan data cited in this work forms part of a growing lexical and syntactic database that I have been building up since 1982. The transcriptions (taxonomic phonemic) are adapted from the phonemic system proposed in Sun (1986); the only changes are the substitutions of IPA symbols for non-IPA ones used in my original thesis. For the transcription of both Old Tibetan and Lhasa Tibetan forms, I follow Wylie's Romanization system based on the standard Written Tibetan orthography. My language consultant has been Mr. Jiayang Danzeng嘉揚丹增 (in Tibetan: Jam-dbyangs Bstan-'dzin). Aged 64 in 1992, Mr. Jiayang is a fluent native speaker of the Mdzo-dge (cæme Xara) variety of Amdo
label for this phenomenon, ¹ has most to do with the attitudes and opinions of the speaker, it is considered to be closely affiliated with modality. ²

The overt and grammaticalized encoding of data source was first discovered in American Indian languages, but it was not widely known until Roman Jakobson christened the phenomenon with the present name in an important treatise on Russian verbal categories (Jakobson 1957). Since then, this semantic category has aroused increasing attention in theoretical linguistics. A conference was held in 1981 at UC Berkeley devoted entirely to cross-linguistic evidential phenomena, and the published proceedings (Chafe

Tibetan (near Ruograi 若兒蓋 County, Aba 阿壩 Autonomous Prefecture of the Tibetan Nationality in north-western Sichuan, China). Although expatriated since 1960, he uses his native dialect daily at home with his compatriot Mr. Ngag-dbang Bsams-'grub, who came with him to Taiwan and has since been living with the Jiayang family. I am greatly indebted to him for his years of enthusiastic and painstaking collaboration and profound friendship, without which this work would not have been feasible. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the formal colloquia of the Institute of History and Philology of the Academia Sinica and at the College of Humanities and Social Sciences of National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan. I wish to thank the following scholars for their detailed comments and support during various stages of the research: James A. Matisoff, Boyd Michailovsky, Martine Mazaudon, Scott DeLancey, Randy J. LaPolla, Pang-hsien Ting, Paul Jen-kuei Li, Hwang-cherng Gong, Chu-Ren Huang, Dah-an Ho, Nicolas Tournadre, Pei-Chuan Wei, and Die-Bin Wu. I am deeply indebted to Randy J. LaPolla for his invaluable help with the pre-publication drafts of this paper. I alone am responsible for the inadequacies that remain.

1 Following Anderson (1986) and Willett (1988), evidentiality is here defined as the linguistic marking of data source. Some authors (e.g. Chafe 1986) have used the term in a broader sense, i.e. to indicate the reliability as well as the source of the speaker's knowledge.

2 There is as yet no consensus on the relationship between evidentiality and modality. Palmer (1986) lists evidentiality along with judgement as the two subcategories under epistemic modality, which expresses the speaker's commitment to what he says, as opposed to deontic modality, which is concerned rather with the speaker's action and that of others. Foley and Van Valin (1984) recognize three subcategories under mood/modality: illocutionary force (roughly corresponding to
and Nichols 1986) has now become the standard reference on the subject.

Evidential systems have now been reported in various language families of the world, with three geographical areas particularly being prone to evidential distinctions: the western regions of the United States, the area around the Black Sea, and the Himalayas (Chafe and Nichols 1986, Willett 1988). In Tibetan, an important Tibeto-Burman language situated in the last-mentioned of the evidentially ‘hot’ regions of the world, an elaborate evidential system is one of the major inflectional categories other than tense/aspect that receives explicit marking on the verb. For a proper understanding of the fundamental essence of Tibetan verbal morpho-syntax, it is imperative that one come to terms with the semantic/pragmatic underpinnings of the evidential system and related grammatical areas.

The existing literature on modern Tibetan evidentiality has been monopolized by Central (Dbus-Gtsang) Tibetan, notably standard Lhasa (e.g.

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Palmer’s deontic modality), status (reality status of the proposition, roughly corresponding to judgement in Palmer’s usage), and modality in the narrow sense (which expresses the speaker’s attitude regarding the relationship between the actor and the accomplishment of the action). Evidentials are treated as constituting an independent category. Chung and Timberlake (1985) also consider evidentials (which they call the epistemological mode) a separate category under mood, distinct from both epistemic and deontic modes.

3 Other Tibeto-Burman languages of China where evidential systems have been reported include Hani (Akha), Sangkhong (a new Lolo-Burmese language, see Li 1991), Tshangla, Cuona Monba, rGyarong, and such recently re-discovered Qiangish languages as Qiang, Zhaba, Primi, Minyak, and Ergong (Huang 1991). More such languages might yet come to light in the future, so long as adequate attention is directed to these phenomena. The variety of Primi reported in Huang (op. cit., Northern dialect, spoken at Muli 木里 County, Sichuan), for instance, formally distinguishes three evidentials: direct visual (unmarked), direct auditory (-sê'ê), and inferential (-ci'). The existence of these forms was completely overlooked in Lu Shaozun’s sketchy description of the same language (Lu 1983).
DeLancey 1985, 1986, 1990; Jin 1979) and the markedly different Sherpa dialect (Schöttelndreyer 1980; Woodbury 1986). Aside from sporadic anecdotal notes, comparable phenomena in other dialects have scarcely made it to the printed page. Still it is safe to conjecture, to the best of our knowledge, that grammaticalized evidentiality constitutes one of the most prominent pan-chronic and pan-dialectal traits of the Tibetan language.

Amdo is a major Tibetan dialect spoken in many closely related varieties in north-western Sichuan, southern Gansu, and eastern Qinghai, China. Up to now, general syntactic studies on Amdo Tibetan have been almost entirely lacking, let alone in-depth treatment of a specialized area of the grammar. From 1982 till 1988, however, I had the good fortune to work with a fluent native speaker of the Mdzo-dge 莫扎盖 variety of Amdo Tibetan (henceforth 'NdziT') in Taiwan; as a result, I was able to gather and analyze ample syntactic data and texts. In this paper, I will survey the evidential contrasts found

4 Sherpa has sometimes been treated in the West as though it were a separate Bodic language (cf. Woodbury's (1986:189) remark that 'Sherpa is a member of the Tibeto-Burman family related very closely to Tibetan'. This is ill-advised considering the range of diversity of modern Tibetan dialects on the one hand, and the rather close affinities of Sherpa to Central Tibetan dialects on the other. Sherpa is also spoken by about 400 people at two villages in Nielamu 納拉木 County near the Sino-Nepalese border in China. Chinese linguists classify Sherpa 夏爾巴 as one of the five varieties (土語) of Central Tibetan, along with the Dbus 貢 variety, the Gtsang 貢藏 variety, the Mnga-ris 阿里 variety, and the Brag-gsum 巴松 variety (Qu et al. 1989).

5 This is equivalent to North-eastern Archaic Tibetan in Rôna-Tas' classificatory scheme (Rôna-Tas 1966).

6 De Roerich (1958) contains a sketchy account of the Rebkong (Tongren 同仁 County, Huangnan 黃南 Autonomous Prefecture of the Tibetan Nationality, Qinghai, China) Amdo dialect, including a collection of twenty-three texts and a useful lexicon. The evidential morphology is buried unanalyzed in his section on 'morphologie' (especially pp.43-7). All in all, the grammatical analysis presented in this book is rather unreliable and must be used with caution.
in the Ndzt verb phrase on the basis of this database. A functional descriptive framework will be adopted throughout the paper which, I believe, is particularly useful for analyzing the complicated evidential phenomena that exist in Tibetan.

A few remarks on the presentation are in order. Since evidentiality has to do with the nature of the information-source underlying the assertions made by the speaker, it is clear that only realis situations 7 are relevant for evidential distinctions. In other words, evidentiality is marked only on verb phrases predicking situations existing either prior to or concurrently with the speech event (i.e., either past or present situations). After a concise overview of the essentials of the Ndzt evidential system (section 2) and a section devoted to tracing the origins of the major evidential markers (section 3), the main body of the paper starts with discussing past situations, for which Tibetan manifests a richer system of evidential contrasts (section 4). Next to be addressed is the greatly reduced system with reference to present situations (section 5). Section 6 surveys the instances where the interaction of evidentiality and aspect yields further evidential distinctions. Following this is a presentation of quotative constructions, which are argued to be members of the Ndzt evidential paradigm (section 7). A summary of the major findings of this study and a preliminary comparison with the Lhasa system are provided in the concluding section (section 8).

\[\text{\textsuperscript{7} 'Situation' is used here as a cover-term for the ontological trichotomy of states ([-dynamic]), processes ([+dynamic] [-telic]), and events ([+dynamic] [+telic]) (Comrie 1976:13; Mourelatos 1981:199ff).}\]
2. Overview of the NdzT Evidential System

In NdzT, information-source is obligatorily marked in the verb phrase by means of a set of auxiliaries and enclitics. The evidential enclitics occur after tense/aspect morphemes, which is quite natural since evidentials take as their scope the whole proposition, and cross-linguistically morphemes with wider scope tend to occur farther away from the verb stem (Bybee 1985: 33-5; Foley & Van Valin 1984: 5.3).

The major evidential markers of NdzT can be illustrated with the following sentences, involving the basic proposition of Bkra-shis (personal name) buying the horse’, with different evidential values:

(1) (a) tsaçi  =ko  tæ  nu  =na  re.  
Bkra-shis  =erg  horse  buy(com)=part  cop
(b) tsaçi  =ko  tæ  nu  =tæ.  
Bkra-shis  =erg  horse  buy(com)  =dir  ev
(c) tsaçi  =ko  tæ  nu  =zæg.  
Bkra-shis=erg  horse  buy(com)  =indir  ev
(d) tsaçi  =ko  tæ  nu  =tæ/zæg  se.  
Bkra-shis=erg  horse  buy(com)  =ev  quot
(e) tsaçi  =ko  tæ  no  =b/kod  =bko.  
Bkra-shis=erg  horse  buy(incom)  =prog.aux  =im  ev

In (1a), a statement is made in a matter-of-fact tone, with the

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8  Morphemes like =na form one phonological word with the preceding morpheme.
   In this paper, such enclitics are marked by a preceding - sign.
9  The following abbreviations are used in glossing the NdzT morphemes:
information-source left unexpressed. Such sentences, which are unmarked for
evidentiality, are known as declarative or gnomic statements (Palmer 1986;
Tournadre 1991: footnote 14). The unmodalized declarative construction is
found mainly in generic statements, proverbial sayings, and stories, but is
ill-suited for informative reports. The rest of the examples in (1) all carry
some evidential marker. In (1b), the speaker reports the event from personal

| abs  | absolutive case | AK  | assimilated knowledge |
| asp  | aspect          | aux | auxiliary            |
| com  | completive aspect | con | clause-linking connective |
| cond | conditional particle | conj | conjunction         |
| cop  | copula          | dat | dative/allative case |
| def  | definite article | desid | desiderative |
| dir ev | direct evidential | dur | durative aspect |
| emph | emphatic particle | erg | ergative case |
| ev   | evidential      | gen | genitive case |
| IFM  | illocutionary force marker |
| im ev | immediate evidential | imp | imperative |
| incom | incomplete aspect | indef | indefinite article |
| indir ev | indirect evidential | loc | locative |
| neg  | negator         | NK  | new knowledge        |
| nom  | nominalizer     | part | particle             |
| prog | progressive     | Q   | interrogative        |
| quot | quotative       | sg  | singular             |

10 In linguistic descriptions of Tibetan published in China, this kind of statement is
known as the *fanchen* 評 項 式, or general statements. The declarative in NdzT
consists of the formula: V=no re/jan. As in other Tibetan dialects, the equative
copulas *jan* and *re* in NdzT carry inherent epistemological values: *jan* indicates
that the reported situation is well-known to the speaker, otherwise *re* is used. In
non-finite clauses where the contrast is neutralized, only *jan* is found. See also
footnote 36. Both the completive and the incompletive stems can appear before =
no re/jan. In the latter case, the construction denotes habitual or future events.

11 I was informed by my consultant that if a situation is reported in the non-
committal declarative, the speaker may often be challenged with the query: 'How
did you find out about that?'. In other words, avoiding evidential marking in
NdzT factual statements may be taken as being somewhat uninformative.
knowledge acquired through direct visual perception of the event; the $=t^*\text{ae}$
enclitic is thus the marker of the direct evidential. (1c), with the $=\text{zog}$
marker, denotes that the knowledge comes from indirect channels, either
hearsay, circumstantial evidence, or inference. We therefore call this kind of
marking the indirect evidential. $^{12}$ (1d), with the quotative marker $se$
signifies that the assertion is based on verbal reports made by others. Finally,
(1e) differs from the other examples above in that, first, the predicated situa-
tion is an ongoing event at the time the statement is being made; and,
second, the speaker’s report is a spontaneous response to a novel event
happening right there in the immediate situation. Following Nichols (1986),
we refer to this morpheme $=^{b}k\text{a}$ as marking the immediate evidential (see
section 5).

In simplest terms, then, the NdzT evidential system contains four basic
evidentials: the direct, the indirect, the quotative, and the immediate,
marked respectively by $=t^*\text{ae}$, $=\text{zog}$, $se$, and $=^{b}k\text{a}$.

3. Historical Origins of the Evidential Markers

The NdzT direct evidential $=t^*\text{ae}$ should, according to regular correspon-
dence rules, trace back to Old Tibetan (hereafter OT) $^{*}tha$, which is
unattested. However, functionally and formally similar morphemes have been
found in Amdo Rebkong ($t^*a$, de Roerich 1958:46) as well as the Khams
dialects Chab-mdo 昌都 ($t^*e:\sim t^*i$, Jin 1958:250) and Sde-dge 德格 ($t^*e$, Gesang
1964:172). In all of these sources, the morphemes in question are claimed to

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$^{12}$ This definition of the indirect evidential tallies with native-speaker intuition that
what is conveyed by the use of $=\text{zog}$ is that the speaker 'didn't see it happen'.
Other languages where the indirect evidential implies both hearsay and
inferential meanings include Tajik, Turkish, and Abkhaz (Palmer 1986:56-7).

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be derived from the OT verb *thal* 'to pass by, elapse'. As */æ/ is the regular NdžT reflex of the OT rhyme -a, rather than of the OT rhyme -al, whose modern reflex in NdžT is the vowel */a/*, it behooves us to account for the apparent irregular correspondence in the NdžT form =ṭha. It is probable that the -l coda from the OT etymon *thal* dropped when the original verb underwent phonological attrition in the process of grammaticalizing into the direct evidential marker. Strong support for this view is provided by other functional morphemes in spoken NdžT which have also irregularly dropped original consonantal codas. Notable examples are the copula *re* (< *red*), the auxiliary verb *go* 'want' (< *dgos*), and the quotative marker *se* (< *zer*, see below). Furthermore, the -d codas of the existential copulas *joḍ* (positive) and *med* (negative) are also often omitted sentence-finally in colloquial NdžT.

The indirect evidential =zaḍ, along with its homonym the indefinite article zaḍ 'a certain', 13 seems to be derived from the OT indefinite article *zhig* ~ *cig*, which in turn is related to the numeral *gcig* 'one'. It is arguable that =zaḍ was grammaticalized from the indefinite determiner via the semantic extension given below:

**referential indefiniteness > evidential indirectness**

The NdžT markers of reported evidence, the simplex quotative *se* and the duplex quotative *dzo=ka se*, are both derived from a verb of speaking in accordance with well-attested universal tendencies (Willett 1988:61,79). The

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13 The indirect evidential =zaḍ differs from the indefinite article zaḍ in one important aspect: unlike the latter, the former is an enclitic which clings to preceding syllables to form one phonological word. For example, the phrase zaḍ 'a certain bird' does not trigger word-internal vowel dissimilation and yield *[ɔazɔʁ]* as it would if zaḍ were an enclitic like the indirect evidential =zaḍ; cf. *ntʃaxm=zaḍ* 'danced (I didn't see it)' → *[ntʃaxmɔzɔʁ]*. For more information on this intriguing phonological rule, see Sun 1986, chap. 3.
morpheme se stems from the OT verb zer ‘to say, to speak’ via (regular) devoicing of the initial and dropping of the -r coda, again an irregular change resulting from phonological weakening during grammaticalization. In Ndzt, se can no longer be used as a normal verb of speaking (see section 5.4 below). The verbal functions of the verb ‘to say’ have largely been taken over by dzo (< OT zlo ‘to chant, to say’), as se has gradually turned into a specialized evidential marker.

We are now left with the immediate evidential =*kə. Gesang (1964: 292, 295) in dealing with a similar particle in the closely related Amdo Bla-brang dialect, spells it sometimes gi, sometimes ki. Yet there is some phonological evidence that the origin of =*kə may be sought elsewhere. Unlike the genitive case marker =ka, the immediate evidential =*kə has an allomorph with a preaspirated initial [kə] in certain phonological environments. From what we know about regular phonological developments of modern Ndzt, this suggests a lexical source in OT with a ki syllable preceded by some kind of non-nasal preradical. So far, however, I have failed to track down this mysterious etymon.

4. Evidentials Related to Past Situations

What was introduced in the preceding section was a simplified survey of how evidentiality is formally instantiated in Ndzt. The full workings of the Ndzt evidential system can be understood only if we scrutinize various
semantic and pragmatic factors underlying the system. To this end, we examine in turn the category person, and the following semantic features of the predicate: volitionality, consciousness, and observability, all of which play important roles in conditioning the formal expression of evidentiality in NdzT. Our discussion in this section will be restricted to verbal reports about past situations, for reasons that will become clear in the next section.

4.1 Person

In Tibetan, the category of person constitutes an important factor which determines much of the verbal morpho-syntax. The relevant oppositions, however, are not the well-known trichotomy of first person (speaker), second person (interlocutor) and third person (other referents), but rather a referentially fluid dichotomous distinction between self-person and other person. 15

15 These terms are based on the labels used by some Chinese linguists: ziechengju 自称句 (self-voice sentence) vs. tachengju 他称句 (other-voice sentence). They are related to, but not identical with, the structurally-based labels 'conjunct' vs. 'disjunct' (cf. Hale 1980; DeLancey 1992). The terms 'conjunct' and 'disjunct' are, incidentally, utterly unrevealing because although the nomenclature appears to be based on structural co-reference of the matrix and complement clause subjects (i.e. 'conjunct' if they are co-referent, 'disjunct' if otherwise), co-reference is actually relevant only when the subject of the complement clause is portrayed as a volitional actor (Hale 1980:96). For instance, in the following Newari sentence,

w3: w3: wo sa tala dhaka; dhala he(erg) he(erg) that noise hear(disjunct) said 'He said he heard that noise.'

although the matrix and embedded clause subjects co-refer, the embedded clause still manifests the 'disjunct' form of the verb (i.e. tala instead of tala) because taya to hear' is a non-volitional verb. Since the distinction involves more than mere structural co-reference, more self-evident labels should be sought, probably along the lines of such semantically-based terms as shenzhi 深知 ('thoroughly inte-
In rather vague terms, self-person sentences are marked as utterances produced by oneself. Unlike the traditional first-person, however, the self-person is not deictically bound to the speaker; rather, it is appropriate not only in first-person statements, but also second-person (non-rhetorical) questions, as well as in certain quotes (see section 5.1). To see how evidentiality is affected by person, observe the following sentences, which all contain the volitional predicate *xabda ndzo 'to go deer-hunting':

(2) (a) *gæ xabda s'og =tæ.
    I(abs) deer-chase(dat) go(com)=part
(b) *gæ xabda s'og=tæ.
(c) *gæ xabda s'og=tæ.
  'I went deer-hunting.'
(3) (a) tc'ekæ 17 xabda s'og =tæ.
you and family(abs) deer-chase(dat) go(com)=dir ev

grated knowledge', see Jin 1983:35), queding 確定, quezhi 確知 ('positive knowledge', cf. e.g. Qu et al 1989:54; Xie 1982: 36), or Tournadre's term egophoric (This label, however, is also quite easy to confuse with the 'self-person' sentence type introduced below. See Tournadre 1991: footnote 13.). What I think is equally important for Tibetan syntax is the opposition proposed in this paper between the 'self-person' vs. 'other-person' types of sentences, because each of these types entails distinct evidential markings and because, ironically, this dichotomy correlates much better with interclausal co-reference than the so-called 'conjunct' vs.'disjunct' contrast (see examples 35-6).

Therefore, Tibetan evidential morphology is by no means a 'person-agreement' system such as what we find in rGyarong and Kiranti.

17 Ndzt distinguishes a set of derived pronominals, exemplified by tc'ekæ, denoting the whole family or household including the referent. Since the reference of tc'ekæ 'you and your family' here includes the addressee, it is a genuine second person pronoun.
(b) tʰekæ  xabda  sʰog  =zog.
you and your family(abs) deer-chase(dat) go(com)=indir ev
(c) *tʰekæ  xabda  sʰog  =næ.
you and your family(abs) deer-chase(dat) go(com)=part
‘You and family went deer-hunting.’

(4) (a) dordze  xabda  sʰog  =læ.
Rdo-rje(abs) deer-chase(dat) go(com)=dir ev
(b) dordze  xabda  sʰog  =zog.
Rdo-rje(abs) deer-chase(dat) go(com)=indir ev
(c) *dordze  xabda  sʰog  =næ.
Rdo-rje(abs) deer-chase(dat) go(com)=part
‘Rdo-rje (personal name) went deer-hunting.’

What the preceding examples reveal is that the self-person sentences in (2) in which the speaker portrays himself as being a volitional participant of the reported event can take =næ (2a) but not the direct (2b) nor the indirect (2c) evidential; on the contrary, the other-person sentences in (3-4) disallow =næ (3c, 4c), but go perfectly well with the other evidentials (3a-b, 4a-b). The exact function of this morpheme is further elucidated by the sentences in (5) below:

(5) (a) ga ndag  tʰag  zog  ma nʰog (*=næ).
I(erg) last night liquor indef neg drink
‘I didn’t drink any liquor last night.’
(b) ga  tʰoma sæ sɡog  (*=næ).
I(erg) groma eat experiential aux
‘I have eaten groma (a kind of medicinal herb) before.’
As evidenced in (5), if the main verb is accompanied by some other lexical material such as a negator (5a) or an auxiliary verb (5b), the =nə morpheme must not occur. Thus the =nə enclitic here seems to be nothing more than a slot-filler with minimal semantic content or pragmatic function, serving merely to add phonological bulk to monosyllabic predicators. It can thus be considered as a default evidential morph, the occurrence of which is conditioned mainly by phonology. 18 What sentences (2) and (4) reveal, then, is that no particular evidential marking is employed for volitional self-person sentences. The reason for this is that since the speaker is expected to know about an act in which he has been a conscious, volitional instigator, any evidential marking to belabor the obvious source of knowledge would be redundant. 19

We have already seen one motivation for positing a two-way person contrast instead of the customary trichotomy in Ndzt, namely to capture the fact that second- and third-person statements share identical evidential markings (cf. 3-4 above). The following sentences provide further support that this dichotomy is the correct one: 20

18 Henceforth this occurrence of =nə (alternating with zero-marking) will be termed the default (evidential) marker.
19 Anderson (1986:277) lists this as one of the universal features of evidential systems: 'When the speaker was a knowing participant in some event (voluntary agent, conscious experiencer), the knowledge of that event is normally direct and evidentials are then often omitted.' Matlock (1989:222) also points out that in many languages the highest degree of certainty of evidence is zero-marked.
20 The validity of the self vs. other person dichotomy is also borne out by evidential behavior in quotative constructions, see section 7 below.
(6) (a) tø'o xabda œ=sʰog?
you (abs) deer-chase Q=go(com)

(b) *tø'o xabda œ=sʰog=tʰ æ?

(c) *tø'o xabda œ=sʰog=zog?
‘Did you go deer-hunting?’

(7) (a) dordze xabda œ=sʰog =tʰ æ?
Rdo-rje (abs) deer-chase Q=go(com) =dir ev

(b) dordze xabda œ=sʰog =zog?
Rdo-rje(abs) deer-chase Q=go(com) =indir ev

(c) *dordze xabda œ=sʰog?
‘Did Rdo-rje go deer-hunting?’

(6-7) show that unlike third-person questions, questions addressed to
the interlocutor about himself behave evidentially like first-person statements.
How is it that evidential morphology is shared by second and third persons
in statements and yet by first and second persons in questions? It turns out
that evidential marking in questions is motivated by a conversational prin-
ciple of cooperation. Specifically, the speaker should put his (non-rhetorical)
questions in the form anticipated in the answer; namely, the self-person
form. Since in this case the speaker poses a question about a volitional event
(deer-hunting) in which the hearer was a fully sentient actor, the response is
expected to be put in such evidential forms as is appropriate for volitional
DeLancey 1990:302-3). This is exactly what we find in the interrogative
sentence (6a).
4.2 Semantic Features of the Predicate

Having dealt with the interaction of person and evidentiality in NdzT, we proceed to discuss the effects of the various intrinsic semantic categories of the predicate on evidential morpho-syntax. Of these semantic categories, volitionality (3.2.1) and consciousness (3.2.2) are relevant to self-person sentences only, while observability (3.2.3) has to do mainly with other-person sentences.

4.2.1 Volitionality

The illustrative examples we have seen in (2-7) all contain *xabda ndzo* 'to go deer-hunting', which is a volitional predicate. Volitionality is probably the most pivotal semantic feature of the Tibetan verb. Volitional acts are performed by the knowing agent of his own free will, and can be transitive (e.g. *sæ 'to eat*) or intransitive (e.g. *jær-e lag 'to stand up*). While volitionality has little to do with the surface case marking of clausal arguments in NdzT, evidentiality in self-person sentences hinges critically on whether the predicate is volitional or non-volitional, as shown in the example below:

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21 Surface case marking in NdzT is mainly determined by valency. Agent arguments of transitive and ditransitive verbs obligatorily take the ergative case. However, experiencer arguments of 'psychological' transitive verbs like 'love', 'hate', 'fear' etc. take the absolutive case instead. Such phenomena as fluid ergative marking on arguments of volitional monovalent verbs reported in Lhasa Tibetan (Chang and Chang 1980:16ff; Hu 1984:5-6; DeLancey 1990:308-40, Tournadre 1991, Che 1992), or theaspectually split ergative pattern in Dbus-Gtsang and Western dialects are unknown in NdzT. In other words, NdzT, and probably other Amdo dialects, display the consistent ergative type. Tibetan has also been claimed to be originally a consistent ergative language; the aspectual split found in some modern dialects (and in the related Newari language) has been attributed to areal influences from Indic languages (DeLancey 1984:138).
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(8) (a) ɲa tø o bønldlæm=t ñi=tø æ.
   I(erg) you(sg. abs) dream =dat dream=dir ev

(b) *ɲa tø o bønldlæm=æ ñi=ñò.
(c) *ɲa tø o bønldlæm=æ ñi=ʒɔg.
   'I dreamed about you.'

(9) (a) ɲa bøgøi tøma øi=tø æ.
   I(erg) pork(gen) smell perceive =dir ev

(b) *ɲa bøgøi tøma øi=ñò.
(c) *ɲa bøgøi tøma øi=ʒɔg.
   'I smelt pork.'

In the above, the speaker is reporting from his own sensory experience what he saw in his dream (8) and what he perceived through his sense of smell (9). Since, however, these non-volitional acts (*ñi 'to dream'; øi 'to perceive') were not under control by the speaker's will, the direct evidential =tø æ is used to indicate that he was merely a passive participant or witness of the portrayed events. In his insightful cognitive account of the evidential scenario in Lhasa Tibetan, which operates on the same general principles as NdzT, DeLancey characterizes the semantic correlate of the formal evidential marking (song in Lhasa Tibetan, =tø æ in NdzT) shared by clauses reporting one's involuntary acts and clauses reporting other people's (regardless of volitionality) in the following way: in both event types the speaker has direct perceptual knowledge of the event itself, but not the antecedent intention or volition. On the other hand, the volitional self-person forms (the default marking) represent direct knowledge of the volition as well as the event parts of the following causal chain (DeLancey 1986:208-11; 1990:302):

Volition -> Event -> Result
Volitionality in this dialect of Tibetan, then, is reflected exclusively by the evidential marking of the verb; this is to be contrasted with Lhasa Tibetan where both nominal case marking and evidential marking are involved (cf. e.g. DeLancey 1985c:51). 22 There is, however, some fluidity in how volitionality conditions evidential morpho-syntax in certain specific circumstances. On the one hand, a subcategory of non-volitional verbs can allow either volitional or non-volitional evidential marking, depending on the degree of control perceived in the reported act. This is the class of verbs denoting bodily functions which are usually not initiated by volition, but the manner in which they are executed is nevertheless subject to volitional control or suppression. Verbs that exemplify such suppressible non-volitional acts include ggragay jed 'to belch'; ʰlakʰæ jed 'to yawn', ʰl to cough', and ʰwadpæ jed 'to sneeze'. 23 Self-person sentences containing such verbs are usually marked with the direct evidential =tʰæ. Alternatively, the default marking can also be employed to show that the speaker not only fails to suppress these acts, but executes them in an even more conspicuous or exaggerated manner. Consider the examples below:

(10)(a) ɲa ntsʰogndi tʰog ni ʰlakʰæ zəg ji =nə

I(erg) meeting(gen) above loc yawn indef do(com) =part

'I yawned (on purpose and in an exaggerated way) at the meeting.'

22 Unlike NdzT, ergative case in Lhasa is conditioned by multiple semantic factors, including control/volition, aspect, and individuation of the object, as well as valency.

23 Contrast these with verbs describing insuppressible non-volitional acts such as ʰdns '(of children) to suffocate and faint' ʰri ʰtəs 'to hiccup', ʰsəd 'to wake up', ʰnəd təp 'to be sleepy', etc.
(b) *\(g\)a **s\(n\)ad t\(s\)o =\(n\)= \(n\)a \(l\)ak\(\ae\) z\(a\)g ji \(t\)h\(\ae\).

I(dat) sleep desire =con yawn indef do(com)=dir ev

'I felt sleepy and yawned (naturally).'

(c) *\(g\)a ts\(s\)edk\(\a\)a gagraj z\(a\)g ji =\(n\)=

I(erg) on purpose belch indef do(com) =part

(c')*\(g\)a ts\(s\)edk\(\a\)a gagraj z\(a\)g ji =t\(h\)h\(\ae\).

'I belched (loudly) on purpose.'

The unacceptability of (10c') shows that when it is clear from the meaning of the sentence that volition (cf. the adverbial ts\(s\)edk\(\a\)a 'on purpose' in 10c-10c') was involved in performing the act, the default marking, which denotes a volitional self-person actor, must be used.

On the other hand, the examples below illustrate the volitional and non-volitional uses of the same predicates:

(11)(a) *\(g\)a der t\(c\)ag =tag.

I(erg) dish break=aux

'I broke the dish (on purpose).'

(a')*\(g\)a ma \(s\a\)m \(s\h\ae\) ni der t\(c\)ag =tag =t\(h\h\ae\).

I(erg) neg think place loe dish break=aux=dir ev

'I broke the dish by accident (literally: when I was "at a non-thinking place").'

(b) *\(g\)a ts\(s\)edk\(\a\)a \(o\)dz\(\ae\) dzog=tag.

I(erg) on purpose milk-tea spill =aux

'I spilled the milk-tea on purpose.'
The direct evidential marking in (11a') and (11b') indicates that even though potentially volitional verbs (tøg 'to break', dzog 'to spill') are used, what is intended by the speaker is rather the lack of volition on his part.

4.2.2 Consciousness

Another important verbal semantic feature conditioning evidential marking of self-person sentences is consciousness. Since volitional acts by definition are executed with fully sentient will, there is no such thing as an 'unconscious volitional act'. Consciousness, therefore, is a semantic subcategory pertinent only to non-volitional predicates. In unconscious non-volitional acts, the experiencer does not know what he is doing since he behaves under completely unconscious or subconscious conditions; e.g. hnaḍ 'to fall asleep'; dzed 'to forget', hgoræ jed 'to snore', hnaḍlaŋ jed 'to sleepwalk', etc. The effect of consciousness on evidential marking is shown by the following sentences:

(12)(a) pæ tøg na =du hnaḍ =saŋ =zæg.
    I(abs) once lie down=when fall asleep =aux =indic ev

(b) *pæ tøg na =du hnaḍ =wa =tʰæ.  

'I fell asleep as soon as I lay down to sleep.'

24 Compare the similar contrast marked with song and =pa yin in Lhasa Tibetan (DeLancey 1990:300).
25 The auxiliary =saŋ, which is the completive/imperative (see below) stem of the
Evidentials in Amdo Tibetan

(13)(a) ṣə ḋaḷ jə ḋaḷ jə ḋaḷ ji =zəg.
I(abs) last night again sleepwalk do(com) =indir ev

(b) ṣə ḋaḷ jə ḋaḷ jə ḋaḷ ji=təwə.
'I sleepwalked again last night.'

That is, when narrating unconscious non-volitional acts that occurred to him in the past, the speaker has to use the indirect evidential to indicate that he was not a knowing, conscious being during the act itself, but found out about the act only afterwards from indirect sources.

One further detail about this intricate area of the NdzT evidential system is worth noting:

(14)(a) ṣə ḋaḷ ḋaḷ jə ḋaḷ ji =zəg.
I(erg) last night sleep-talk do(com)=indir ev
'I talked in my sleep last night.'

(b) ṣə ḋaḷ ḋaḷ jə ḋaḷ ma ji =zəg.
I(erg) last night sleep-talk neg do(com)=indir ev
'I didn’t talk in my sleep last night.'

(15) ṣə tədu tədu jə ḋaḷ =təwə.
I(abs) then still neg fall asleep =dir ev
'At that time, I wasn’t asleep yet.'

verb ḋaḷ ‘to go’, alternates, for some reason, with another enclitic auxiliary =wə (< OT ‘bud(incom)-bud (com) ‘to fall off, to disappear’) such that =wə (with the deletion of the -d coda) is used before the direct evidential =təwə, while =təwə occurs with the indirect evidential =zəg. Both seem to add the adverbial meaning ‘off, away’ to verbs denoting change of state. Unlike song and byung in Lhasa, they are by no means evidential markers.
When the speaker denies having undergone unconscious events, care must be taken as to whether consciousness was still involved in the negated situation in order to use the proper evidential marking. 'yarwa ‘to snore’ and 'ndjød jed ‘to talk in one’s sleep’ are good examples of necessarily unconscious events, negated or otherwise, because in either case the participant involved (the speaker) would be asleep, hence the indirect evidential in both (14a) and (14b). On the other hand, when such unconscious non-volitional predicates as tof ‘to faint’, 'ndd ‘to fall asleep’, and 'ndjor jed ‘to doze off’ are negated in self-person sentences, the speaker must necessarily be conscious at the reported time, which accounts for the obligatory direct evidential marking in (15).

The most intriguing predicate that reveals the fine-tuned sensitivity of Ndzt to the semantic category of consciousness is 'nddlæm-e 'ni ‘to dream of’, as exemplified in (8), repeated below as (16):

(16) ga tøo 'nddlæm-e 'ni =tøe.
I(erg) you (sg. abs) dream = dat dream = dir ev
'I dreamed of you.'

The activity ‘to dream of’ differs from the other activities which occur during sleep in that it has to take the direct, rather than the indirect, evidential in self-person sentences. An account based on the physiological realities of subconscious brain activities in dreaming suggests itself. Although dreams occur during certain phases of sleep, the undergoer is strictly speaking not entirely unconscious of the experience; this is supported by the well-known fact that dreams can sometimes be vividly remembered after one wakes up. It stands to reason, then, that Ndzt seems to treat ‘to dream of’ as a kind of

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subconscious visual experience, rather than categorize it with truly unconscious activities.

4.2.3 Observability

The semantic categories volitionality and consciousness have been discussed with specific reference to self-person sentences, one major use of which being the speaker's reports about his own activities or physical/mental states. The reason for this will be evident by examining the following other-person sentences:

(17)(a) kʰu ri btsi =tʰæ.
    he (erg) hiccup =dir ev
    'He hiccuped (I saw it).'
(b) kʰu ri btsi =zog.
    he(erg) hiccup =indir ev
    'He hiccuped (I didn't see it).'

(18)(a) kʰu bgnadjor ji =tʰæ.
    he (erg) dozing-off do(com) =dir ev
    'He dozed off (I saw it).'
(b) kʰu bgnadjor ji =zog.
    he (erg) dozing-off do(com) =indir ev
    'He dozed off (I didn't see it).'

It is clear that in other-person statements, no matter whether the verb is volitional (e.g. 'to go deer-hunting' cf. (3a-b; 4a-b)), non-volitional (e.g. 'to hiccup' cf. (17)), or unconscious non-volitional (e.g. 'to doze off' cf. (18)),

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evidential marking follows one straightforward principle: direct evidential if
the speaker's knowledge is acquired through direct perceptual experience;
indirect evidential otherwise. Volitionality and consciousness, then, are
irrelevant for evidentiality in other-person sentences. Yet, it is necessary to
recognize another semantic category, seldom discussed in the evidential
literature, which plays a special role in conditioning evidential usage in other-
person sentences. This is the category of observability. Some situations are
always directly available for objective observation and description by the
onlooker; verbs denoting such observable situations include volitional ones
like ndza 'to write', utza 'to rescue', ndag 'to sit', and non-volitional ones
like log 'to fall over', nte 'to die', ragn 'to be tall'. Other states and acts do
not necessarily have an overt outward manifestation, and are therefore not
subject to direct observation. Verbs expressing such unobservable situations
also cut across the volitionality distinction; they include inner physiological
sensations like nae 'to hurt/ache', sae 'to itch', ragn 'to see', ko 'to hear/
understand', tseg 'to feel', *kom 'to be thirsty', ntseg 'to feel cold', etc. and
mental states and activities like gae 'to like; love; be glad', *naagnag 'to hate;
bear grudge', tse 'to miss; think of; recall', tshagdog jed 'to envy', ndag
dzeg 'to ponder; consider; calculate', ratse 'to be jealous (as of lovers)',
etc. What these verbs have in common is that they convey inner situations
that are inaccessible for direct observation and can only be inferred
subjectively by onlookers on the basis of tangible clues. Examine now the
following sets of sentences:

(19) (a) tødu k'o øiøø *tøg jöd =tæ.
    at that time he(abs) very hungry aux =dir ev

    (b) *tødu k'o øiøø *tøg=tæ.

    'He was very hungry at that time.'
cf. (a') tadjum gae phiyang tog =tbae.

at that time I(abs) very hungry =dir ev

(b') tadjum gae phiyang htag jod=tbae.

'I was very hungry at that time.'

(20)(a) k'o amni'ma'tep'en =ka rar*tse rag jod =tbae.

he(erg) Amnyimachen =gen peak see aux =dir ev

(b') k'o amni'ma'tep'en =ka rar*tse rag =tbae.

'He saw the peak of the Amnyimachen (mountain).' cf. (a') gae amni'ma'tep'en =ka rar*tse rag =tbae.

I(erg) Amnyimachen =gen peak see =dir ev

(b') gae amni'ma'tep'en =ka rar*tse rag jod=tbae.

'I saw the peak of the Amnyimachen (mountain).' (21)(a) labzang tophog =du mo gae jod=tbae.

Blo-bzang small =when her(dat) love aux=dir ev

(b') labzang tophog =du mo gae =tbae.

'Blo-bzang loved her when he was small.' cf. (a') gae tophog =du mo gae =tbae.

I(abs) small =when her(dat) love =dir ev

(b') gae tophog =du mo gae jod=tbae.

'I loved her when I was small.' (22)(a) k'o tophog =du tsgog tboj=tbae.

he(abs) small =when emph short =dir ev

'He was really short when he was small.'

(b) gae tophog =du tsgog tboj=tbae.

I(abs) small =when emph short =dir ev

'I was really short when I was small.'
What the preceding examples show is that unobservable verbal situations like 'tog 'to be hungry' (19), rog 'to see' (20) or gae 'to love' (21) must take a special marker in other-person sentences, namely the perfect auxiliary jod. 26 Note that this auxiliary does not appear if an observable state such as t*og 'to be short' (22) is involved.

The choice of the perfect auxiliary jod as a marker of indirect observation is well-motivated. Since the perfect presents a past event as being viewed from the perspective of the present state, it is naturally extendable to the evidential domain to mark the assertions the speaker (an onlooker in this case) makes about other people's inner states or processes based on indirect results in the tangible present state. 27

5. Evidentials Related to Present Situations

An essential difference between past and present situations in terms of epistemology and evidentiality is that in the latter case the situations happen-

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26 Japanese also requires non-first person sentences with unobservable predicates to carry some special marking, such as the auxiliary garu (which is glossed 'display symptoms of being ...') in the example below (Aoki 1986:224-8):

(i) kare wa atu-gat-te -i -ru
    he topic hot -aux-gerund -be -nonpast
(ii) *kare wa atu-i
    'He is hot.'
    cf. (iii) watashi wa atu -i.
    I topic hot -nonpast
    'I am hot.'

27 A connection between perfect aspect and inferential evidentials has also been observed in the following languages: Georgian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Estonian, Turkish, Chinese Pidgin Russian, and Jaqaru-Aymara (Comrie 1976:108-110; DeLancey 1982:175; Anderson 1986: 275; Willett 1988:79). It turns out that Tibetan, with its more fully developed evidential system, utilizes perfect marking to denote a related but more specific type of inferred evidence.
ing at the time and place of speaking may or may not be already known or expected by the speaker. On the other hand, the past situations recounted by the speaker, regardless of information-source, must by definition have already been incorporated into the speaker's knowledge system. This pragmatic difference motivates the use of special evidentials unique to present contexts. There are, however, a number of points to clarify regarding the present-past dichotomy before we proceed. First of all, the presentation in terms of present vs. past situations in this paper is purely for expository expediency, for Tibetan does not have a true tense system in which the speaking time serves as the absolute deictic reference point. In the first place, the vestigial OT verb-stem alternations, the so-called 'three-tense (dus-gsum)' conjugation paradigms, do not mark true tense in NdzT (nor do they seem to have ever done so in OT; DeLancey 1980:40). Rather, what the 'past' stems of the dwindling set of irregular verbs convey is the completedness of the event. This is borne out clearly in the following examples:

28 Absolute tense is alien to Sino-Tibetan and perhaps to languages of South-East Asia in general. Readers of such works as Woodbury 1986 or Tournadre 1991 might be misled into thinking otherwise by the use of labels like 'present', 'past', or 'aorist' that usually designate absolute tenses in European languages. As will be argued below, even though other-person propositions about present vs. past events are apparently marked differently in the VP, the distinction has to do rather with evidentiality.

29 Tournadre proposes the terms 'accomplished' vs. 'unaccomplished' in place of the more misleading terms 'perfective' vs. 'imperfective', because the latter pair of terms is often associated with a quite disparate aspectual contrast in Slavic languages (Tournadre 1991: footnote 12). Comrie (1976:18) spells out the essential difference as follows: '...the use of the perfective puts no more emphasis necessarily on the end of the situation than on any other part of the situation, rather all parts of the situation are presented as a single whole...', whereas 'The use of 'completeive'... puts too much emphasis on the termination of the situation.' In Tibetan, it is exactly the termination part of the situation that is
(23) (a) te'u su =na s’og!
you (sg. erg) eat (com) =part go (imp)
‘Eat (it) before you go!’

(b) xæ sæ næ øæø saKæ
meat eat (incom) cond we-two restaurant
næ =e ndzo!
inside =dat go (desid)
‘If (we want to) eat meat, let’s go to the restaurant.’

(c) gormæ su næ dzæg =na 30 ma re.
vegetables eat (com) cond full =con neg cop
‘(We) will not feel full if (we) eat vegetables.’

(23a) exemplifies the relative-tense marking function of the completive stem su of the verb sæ ‘to eat’, whereby the two (future!) events are sequenced in time such that the leaving is to take place after the eating has finished. The aspectual nature of the distinction can also be seen by contrasting the use of the incompletive (23b) vs. the completive stems (23c) in conditional clauses. The completive stem su in (23c) evidently has nothing to do with the deictic category tense since the conditional clause here does not conveyed by the so-called past stems. Hence, I will label the two stems ‘completive’ and ‘incompletive’. Similar terminology has been used all along by Chinese Tibetan linguists, such as wancheng 完成 or yiran 已然 (‘completed/accomplished’) vs. wei-wancheng 未完成 or weiran 未然 (‘not yet completed/unaccomplished’), e.g. Qu and Tan 1983:66; Xie 1982:39.

30 Amdo Tibetan, like other Tibeto-Burman languages, is a clause-chaining language. Predicates in non-final clauses are non-finite in morphology and usually take the morpheme =na (< OT nas), which is a semantically bleached connective enclitic (cf. Delancey 1991:3). Incidentally, this morpheme is homophonous to the other =na morpheme that appears in the sentence-final evidential slot (see above).
convey any time reference (i.e. it is atemporal). Rather, unlike in (23b), the terminal end of the act of eating is emphasized in (23c); i.e. the meaning of the sentence is: 'even if one has eaten vegetables, one does not feel full'.

(24a-b) below provide even stronger evidence for the absence of absolute tense in NdzT. In these self-person sentences with volitional predicates, no matter whether the speaker talks about his present (note the time adverbial tāe 'now' in (24a)) or past (note the time adverbial tædu 'then' in (24b)) activities, the same verb forms are used.

(24)(a)tæe nge tæe ntbog =bka jod.
now I(erg) tea drink =asp aux
'I am drinking tea now.'  

31 cf. (b)tædu nae nge tæe ntbog =bka jod
then loc I(erg) tea drink =asp aux
'I was drinking tea at that time.'

This brings up the related issue of the function of the morpheme =bka (henceforth =bka') in the sentences in (24). This morpheme, not to be confused with the homophonous evidential marker =bka (henceforth =bka', see below), is cognate to the verbal ending (written) =gi in Lhasa and other dialects. 32 It is well-known that the occurrence of =gi is restricted to the

31 tæe ntbog, literally 'to drink tea', is also the idiomatic way to say 'to dine; to eat a meal' in Amdo Tibetan.

32 This clitic morpheme is often treated as a functionally obscure affix (cf. Jin 1983; Qu and Tan 1988:71; but see Xie 1982:39). DeLancey has not been explicit about the function of this grammatical morpheme either; he often includes =gi with the following auxiliary or copula and glosses the whole string with the label 'imperfective'. =gi in Lhasa, by the way, has never been reported
imperfective or incompleteive stem (Xie 1982:39; DeLancey 1990:294; Tournadre 1991: footnote 9). If, however, we take into account other colloca
tional constraints on the use of =³kɔ', we soon realize that it cannot simply
be a general imperfective marker in NdzT. The critical fact is that =³kɔ'
(unlike '=gi in Lhasa) normally cannot co-occur with either stative or
punctual verb stems, as illustrated in the following examples with the
verb ndag 'to sit' in both its stative and dynamic uses, as well as the
punctual verb rag 'to see':

to exhibit such co-occurrence restrictions with stative and punctual verbs as we
find in NdzT (see immediately below). Thus the enclitic =gi in Lhasa may well
have developed from an original progressive to a general imperfective marker.

33 Stative and punctual verbs correspond to states and achievements in Vendler's
(1967) quadripartite classification scheme. Some stative verbs, e.g. zo 'to be
drunk' and k'u 'to be ill', can take the progressive marker =³kɔ', but then
become inchoative in meaning. Compare the following examples:

(i) k'ɔ zo jod=³kɔ'.
   he(abs) drunk aux=im ev
   'He is drunk.'

(ii) k'ɔ zo =³kod' (kɔ' + jod) =³kɔ'.
   he(abs) drunk =prog.aux = im ev
   'He is getting drunk.'

34 This is one of the few verbs in NdzT that show suppletive stem-alternations:
ndag (incom)-ded (com)-dod (imp). The incompleteive stem ndag is derived from
a different OT root 'dug 'to sit, live, stay' than the other two stems, which
come from the OT verb sdod (incom and imp)-bsdad (com and future) with the
same meaning. That is, the incompleteive stem dod has been displaced by the
suppletive form ndag in NdzT. Interestingly, in some Western and Dbus-Gtsang
dialects, OT 'dug has grammaticalized into an existential copula (corresponding
to NdzT jod=³kɔ'), while the completeive stem bsdad has also usurped the incom-
pleteive stem sdod.

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(25) (a) gae ndana ded (*=kɔ) jod.
I(abs) here sit(com) aux.
'I am sitting here (stative).'

cf. (b) gae tae sʰa ndag (*=kɔ) jod.
I(abs) now down sit(incom) aux
'I am sitting down now (dynamic).'

(c) kʰu mo rag (*=kɔ) jod=ʰkɔ.
he(erg) she(abs) see aux=im ev
'He sees her (punctual).'

On the basis of the facts presented above, I contend that =kɔ is nothing else than the marker of the progressive aspect. Since an event in progress is by definition not yet completed, it follows that kɔ cannot be attached to completive verb stems. Punctual verbs, because of their inherent non-durative meaning, obviously also conflict with the progressive aspect. Furthermore, it is well-known that stative verbs do not go well with the implied dynamicity of the progressive aspect either (Comrie 1976:12). Instead, completive stems, if any, appear directly before the auxiliary jod, which is then formally identical to the perfect construction (25a, 25c).

We are now ready to examine evidential contrasts pertaining to the present speech-act situation. Observe both the self-person (26) and the other-person sentences (27) below:

(26) (a) tae gə tae nʰog=ʰkɔ jod(*=kɔ).
now I(erg) tea drink=prog aux
'I am drinking tea now.'
(b) \( \text{ta} \quad \text{ga} \quad \text{ngo} \quad \text{kh}u =^{h}k_{a}^{1} \quad \text{jod} =^{h}k_{a}^{2} \).  

now I(gen) head ache=prog aux=im ev  

'\text{My head is beginning to ache now.}'

(c) \( \text{ta} \quad \text{ga} \quad \text{tg} \quad (* \text{jod}) =^{h}k_{a}^{3} \).  

now I(abs) hungry =im ev  

'I am hungry now.'

(27)(a) \( \text{ta} \quad \text{kh}u \quad \text{te} \quad \text{nt} \quad \text{noj} =^{h}k_{a}^{1} \quad \text{jod} =^{h}k_{a}^{2} \).  

now he(erg) tea drink =prog aux=im ev  

'\text{He is drinking tea now (I just found out).}'

(b) \( \text{ta} \quad \text{kh}_0 \quad \text{tg} \quad \text{jod} =^{h}k_{a}^{3} \).  

now he(abs) hungry aux =im ev  

'\text{He is hungry now (I can tell).}'

Comparing (26) with (27), we find that with reference to ongoing events in the speech-act situation, the evidential options are greatly reduced. Similar to what we find in past situations, no marking whatsoever is needed when the speaker depicts himself as a knowing, volitional actor in the ongoing situation (26a, cf. also 24a-b). The evidential enclitic =\(^{h}k_{a}^{3}\) occurs in all other cases. For the same reason given above in section 4.2.3, moreover, assertions concerning other people's current inner situations also obligatorily require the additional auxiliary jod.

The use of this what may be termed the immediate evidential\(^{35}\) indicates

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\(^{35}\) Woodbury ms. uses the conceptually very similar terminology 'deictic'/ 'proximal' for the functionally equivalent Sherpa evidential -\text{nok}. For the parallel contrast of 'dug vs. yod in Lhasa, Goldstein has been labeling this dimension 'specificity'; the specific existential 'dug is used with respect to knowledge deriving from a specific situation or state as opposed to common or general knowledge (cf. Goldstein 1991: 29-30).
that the speaker's basis for his assertion comes solely from perceptible evidence directly present in the immediate speech-act situation. What is crucial here is that the speaker implicitly denies having any information regarding the situation prior to the current perceptual experience; in other words, this knowledge is entirely novel for the speaker. Among currently ongoing situations, there is only one type that is automatically ruled out as constituting possible new knowledge to the speaker, namely, his own volitional acts which he is naturally able to track from inception. The absence of =kə in self-person volitional sentences like (24a-b) and (26a) is therefore well-motivated.

The immediate evidential is intimately linked to present situations. As the following example shows, the =kə evidential seems unacceptable in non-present situations:

\[(28) \text{todu nae k'u təe n'og } \cdot \text{jod } =təe/\ast =kə} \]

then loc he(erg) tea drink =prog aux =dir ev

'He was drinking tea at that time (I saw it).'

After carefully going through many relevant conversational settings with

36 The declarative is used, in contrast, to show that the information is already an integrated part of the speaker's knowledge structure. DeLancey (1989) posits this distinction as a separate epistemological category of new knowledge (NK) vs. assimilated knowledge (AK) (the NK category is also labeled mirative). In NdZT, as in Lhasa, equative copulas do manifest distinct NK (re <OT red) vs. AK (jon <OT yin) forms. The NK form of the NdZT existential copula jod=kə, however, is formed by means of inflectional morphology rather than lexical suppletion (cf. yod <-> dug in Lhasa). Amdo Tibetan, then, is more like such Tibeto-Burman languages as Newari in that the NK vs. AK contrast is marked chiefly on verb stems rather than via distinct copulas, except that Newari has no mirative distinction whatsoever in the copula (cf. DeLancey 1989: endnote 6 and p.c. December 1991; see also section 8 below).
my consultant, however, we discovered more subtleties of the usage of this evidential. Following are three of the particularly interesting situations that we looked into, together with the corresponding sentences showing the proper evidential uses in the respective cases: (1) The speaker goes upstairs to find out what his son is doing, and upon coming back, reports his finding to an interlocutor in the living room downstairs (29). (2) While talking on the phone with an interlocutor, the speaker hears the baby crying in the other room and asks to be excused for a moment to go check (30). (3) The speaker, who is not in the kitchen now, saw Bkra-shis making Tibetan momos (a kind of steamed bread with meat-filling) in the kitchen a short while ago and is reporting what he assumes Bkra-shis must still be doing now (31).

(29) kʰu jər e ndə =kʰod =kə(*/=tə)
   he(erg) letter write (incom) =prog. aux =ev
   'He is writing a letter.'

(30) kʰo hɔr e nə pə =kʰod =kə, nə sʰəŋ =nc
   he(abs) there loc cry =prog.aux =ev I(abs) go(com)=con
   toəg hə ta dæ l
   a little look(desid) IFM
   'He is crying over there; let me go and take a look.'

(31) təŋ ʰi =kə tə mu mə li =kʰod =tʰə
   Bkra-shis=erg now momo make =prog.aux =dir ev
   'Bkra-shis is now making momos (I saw him do so just now).'

In none of these cases does the event location overlap exactly with the speech-act location; since, however, the first two events (the son writing a letter, the baby crying) are judged subjectively by the speaker to happen in
the immediate vicinity of the speech act location, the use of the immediate
evidential =kə is still felicitous. In contrast, by deliberately choosing the
direct evidential =tə in (31), the speaker claims that the time when he
witnessed the momo-making activity has passed and therefore his assertion is
not validated by what he can directly observe here and now. (31) also illus-
trates nicely that although =tə (for that matter =zəg also) is often correlated
with past events, tense is certainly not its primary meaning. Hence, it is not
contradictory to have it co-occur with adverbials denoting the present time
(e.g. tə 'now' in (31)). This reinforces the point made earlier that there is
no absolute tense system in Tibetan, and that the correlation of evidentiality
with present vs. past situations is meant to be of heuristic utility only.

In languages such as Turkish (Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986), the equivalent
of the NdżT immediate evidential often has an implied inferential meaning.
This does not seem to be the case in NdżT. Yet, there is indeed a derived
inferential evidential built on the immediate evidential marker =kə, namely,
ša jod =kə (phonetically [ʃəzəkə]). 37 This complex inferential construction
denotes specifically that the assertion is inferred from circumstantial evidence

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37 The etymology of ša is not entirely certain. If we go by the regular sound
correspondences between OT and NdżT, we should expect an OT etymon sal,
not listed in any Tibetan dictionaries available to me. Other uses of ša in NdżT,
however, provide us with a clue. As a stative verb, ša can means 'clear, legible';
e.g.:

jäe tsi =no ndə ša =wo zəg re.
wourd write =nom this clear =part indef cop
'This word is written clearly.'

The normal OT word with this meaning is gsal, which is also glossed 'visible,
conspicuous, obvious'. Since the OT initial cluster gs- under normal circum-
stances corresponds to NdżT unaspirated s- rather than aspirated s-, our best
guess is that the OT origin of the NdżT form ša- is an unprefixed alloform sal.
present at the location of the speech-act. For example:

(32) K'o jog jod s'a jod=-kə;
he(abs) come aux inferential ev
k'u ham gokhæ næ had c'ag jod=-kə.
his boot doorway loc take-off(com) put(com) aux=im ev

‘He must have come, (for) his boots are (lit. were taken off and put)
at the door.’

6. Interaction of Tense/Aspect and Evidentiality

Twice already in the preceding discussion we have touched upon the
interface of tense/aspect and evidentiality in NdzT. First, the use of the
perfect or retrospective aspect (V (com) + jod(=*kə)) was found to be a
formal marker of indirect attestation in other-person clauses involving
unobservable situations (cf. 3.2.3). Sentence (31) in the foregoing section
also exemplified how the direct evidential may co-exist with the progressive
aspect.

Actually, NdzT exhibits a full array of instances where various tense/
aspect forms are combined with the same basic evidentials; some of these
composite forms may express further evidential distinctions. Following are a
set of examples containing the other-person proposition ‘He made some
momos’ and the direct evidential =tʰæ:

(33)(a) k'u mumu zag li =tʰæ.
he(erg) momo some make =dir ev

‘He made some momos (I saw it).’

— 980 —
(b) kʰu mumu zag li jod =tʰæ.
    he(erg) momo some make aux =dir ev
    'He has made some momos (I saw it).'

(c) kʰu mumu zag li =ʰkɔ̆ jod =tʰæ.
    he(erg) momo some make =prog aux =dir ev
    'He was making some momos (I saw it).'

(d) kʰu mumu zag li =ʰkɔ̆ ded 38 jod =tʰæ.
    he(erg) momo some make =prog dur aux =dir ev
    'He had been making some momos (when I saw it).'

(e) kʰu mumu zag li =dzø jan =tʰæ.
    he(erg) momo some make =nom cop =dir ev
    'He was going to make some momos (I saw it).'

(f) kʰu mumu zag li jod =dzø jan =tʰæ.
    he(erg) momo some make aux =nom cop =dir ev
    'He was going to make some momos (I saw him make preparations).'

The interpretations of (33a) and (33b) are straightforward; in both cases, the speaker declares that he has witnessed the momo-making event in its entirety, including the resultant existence of the momos produced. The difference between these two sentences is a pragmatic one. Rather than merely recounting an event happening in the past (as in (33a)), in (33b) the perfect is used to mark the past event as being relevant to the present situation. By choosing the progressive aspect in (33c), however, the speaker claims visual knowledge only of the event being in progress some time in the

38 This durative aspect auxiliary exemplifies another usage of the same verb ndɔɡ 'to sit, live, stay' discussed in footnote 34 above. Here the perfect form of this auxiliary ded(com) + jod is found, commonly contracted as dod.
past. He is not certain, in other words, whether the event is still going on at this moment or whether it has been completed. 39 With the durative auxiliary *ded* (completive stem of *ndag*) added to the progressive, (93d) predicates specifically that by the time the speaker perceived the event, the *momo*-making activity had already been going on for a while. Both (93e) and (93f) are characterized by a relative future tense marker comprising the clause-nominalizer *dzo* plus the copula *jan*. This minimal pair, (93e) and (93f), involves a subtle evidential contrast. In (93e), the speaker claims to have first-hand knowledge of the actor's volition to realize the event, but not of the event itself. Whereas in (93f), with the extra aspectual auxiliary *jod*, the speaker further testifies that he actually witnessed the actor's initial preparations leading to the event (in this case, kneading dough, mincing meat, etc.).

Thus, through the interaction of various verbal aspects and evidentials, subtle secondary evidential meanings can be further distinguished in Ndzt by highlighting the particular phases of the event as perceived by the speaker.

7. Quotative Constructions

We now turn to quotative constructions, which register another type of indirect information-source: evidence via verbal report. As argued in section 5.4., these quotatives constitute integral parts of the Ndzt evidential system.

39 This distinction is akin to the perfective vs. imperfective meaning contrast in embedded non-finite clauses after verbs of perception in English, e.g. *I saw him closing the door.* vs. *I saw him close the door.*
7.1 The Simplex Quotative Construction

In NdzT, the most common quotative construction consists of a quoted clause followed by a quotative element se, by means of which the speaker explicitly claims that the proposition he makes (the quoted clause) is based on someone else's verbal report; hence, he is uncommitted to its truthfulness. We will call it the simplex quotative construction in order to differentiate it from a formally and functionally more complex construction (see below). By definition, a quotative sentence includes an original speaker, the one who made the original assertion, and the actual speaker/quoter, who restates what he has heard from the former. In NdzT, quotative constructions must copy the evidential morphology of the original assertion to reflect the epistemological stance of the original speaker. For example:

(34)(a) *kʰərnəb nə xor=wə =tʰæ se.*
  last night fire slip=away =dir ev quot
  'I heard (from someone who saw it happen) that a fire broke out last night.'

(a') *kʰərnəb nə xor=sʰog=zəɡ se.*
  last night fire slip =away=indir ev quot
  'I heard (from someone who didn't see it happen) that a fire broke out last night.'

Thanks to the evidential marking preserved from the original assertions, it is easy to tell whether the original speaker was an eyewitness to the reported accident (34a) or not (34a').

Even more interestingly, examples (35-6) below demonstrate how this
predominant principle helps clarify the co-reference relation between the
subject of the quoted clause and the original speaker:

(35)(a) tṣa'i ju =e jogs =no se.
Bhra-shis (abs) home=dat come=con quot
'(I heard Bhra-shis himself say that) Bhra-shis has come home.'

(a') tṣa'i ju =e jogs =twe se.
Bhra-shis (abs) home=dat come=con quot
'(I heard someone else say that) Bhra-shis has come home.'

(36)(a) adæ tāb =wο =twe se.
uncle faint=away =dir ev quot
'Uncle passed out (I heard from an eyewitness).'

(a') adæ tāb =sʰog =zog se.
uncle faint =aux =indir ev quot
(1) 'Uncle passed out (I heard from a non-eyewitness).'
(2) 'Uncle passed out (I heard from uncle himself).'

The default marking in the context of a volitional predicate jogs 'to
come' characterizes (35a) as a self-person statement, so the original speaker
must be Bhra-shis himself. By the same token, the presence of the other-
person (i.e. direct) evidential marking unequivocally identifies (35a') as
being quoted from someone who witnessed the event. Similarly, since the
verb tāb 'to swoon' belongs to the non-volitional unconscious category, the
use of the direct evidential in (36a) also clearly marks it as an other-person
statement. (36a'), on the other hand, is ambiguous; the embedded quote can
either be a self-person report heard from the uncle who had regained
consciousness or an other-person statement about the uncle made by a
non-witness third person.

Next to be considered are two subtleties regarding the NdzT quotative constructions. First, the quoter need only be present to hear the original speaker make the utterance; i.e. he does not have to be the direct addressee. Strictly speaking, therefore, what se really means is ‘I heard’ rather than ‘I was told’. For instance:

(37) ami lhæmo tәho ma ndzo se.
Mom(erg) Lha-mo(dat) you(sg. abs) neg go(incom) quot
‘Mom said to Lha-mo: “Don’t go!” (I heard).’

The dative-case inflection of lhæmo (‘to Lhamo’) in (37) makes it obvious that it was to Lhamo, rather than to the quoter, that the quoted command was directed. The speaker in (37), in other words, is reporting what he overheard at the original speech-act locale.

The second detail to discuss is that, unlike such English expressions as they say, people say, and it is said, etc., the NdzT quotative constructions marked with se are not employed to convey generally known hearsay or rumor, for which evidentially unmarked declaratives containing the verb dzo ‘to say’ are used instead. Compare (38a) and (38a’):

(38)(a) k’o no heptәa zәg jan dzo =nә re.
he(abs) person gluttonous indef cop say =con cop
‘It is said that he is a glutton.’

(a’) k’o no heptәa zәg jan se.
he(abs) person gluttonous indef cop quot
‘He is a glutton (I heard him say himself).’

*‘It is said that he is a glutton.’
7.2 The Duplex Quotative Construction

It sometimes happens that one (a second quoter) may repeat verbal reports received not 'straight from the horse's mouth' (the original narrator), but indirectly via the report of another person (the first quoter). NdžT has a structurally more complex construction, which we will call the duplex quotative construction, which mirrors nicely this more complex situation of second-hand verbal reporting. This quotative marker consists of a collocation of the verb dzo 'to say', the immediate evidential =³kə⁷, and the quotative se, i.e. dzo=³kə⁷ se. The following sentences illustrate the proper occasions for using the duplex vs. the simplex quotatives:

(89)(a) A says to B:

`gæ tʰewo jan.
I(abs) Thepo cop
'I am from the Thepo tribe.'

(b) B transmits the information to C:

`kʰo tʰewo jan se
he(abs) Thepo cop quot
'He is from the Thepo tribe (I heard A himself say so).'

(c) C in turn relays the information to D:

`kʰo tʰewo jan dzo=³kə⁷ se
he(abs) Thepo cop say =im ev quot
'He is from the Thepo tribe (I heard from B, who heard A himself say so).'

The evidential import of the duplex quotative is that the speaker
explicitly denies that his knowledge of the assertion comes directly from the original verbal source. Thus, the relation between the simplex and the duplex quotatives parallels that between the direct and the indirect evidentials, in that the duplex quotative, like the indirect evidential, indicates one-degree less solid evidential support for what is being asserted. This parallelism is represented in the following diagram:

channel | source directly perceived | source not directly perceived
sensory  | direct ev (=tʰæ)          | indirect ev (=zag)
verbal   | simplex quot (se)         | duplex quot (dzo=s kϕ se)

In NdzT, the duplex quotative construction occurs very frequently in natural discourse, and is obligatory wherever the conditions for its use are met. This reflects the importance of epistemological source marking in NdzT morpho-syntax, as well as the extent to which evidentiality is grammaticalized in the language.

7.3 Syntactic Characteristics of the Quotative marker se

The quotative se originates from an OT transitive verb 'to say' (see section 6 above), which took embedded clauses as its objects. What, then, is the categorical status of se in modern NdzT? Has it already become a completely grammaticalized element, like the direct evidential =tʰæ (which also has a verbal origin), or does it still retain verbal characteristics?

The examples below reveal not only that se originated from a ditransitive verb, but that its agent and recipient arguments (i.e. the original speaker and interlocutor) can still be overtly expressed:
(40) mu pana mo ndzo go se.
    she(erg) we two(dat) she(abs) go (incom) want quot
    'She wants to go (she told us two).'

Also, in (40), se behaves like an ordinary argument-taking verb in being capable of assigning case to its arguments.

Furthermore, se, like ordinary main verbs, can also undergo adverbial modification:

(41)(a) dzemnts'u k'arnab (k'o) ndzo go se
    Rgya-mtsho(erg) last night (he(abs)) go(incom) want quot
    'Rgya-mtsho wants to go (I heard him say so last night).'

cf. (b) dzemnts'bo k'arnab ndzo go se.
    Rgya-mtsho(abs) last night go(incom) want quot
    'Rgya-mtsho wanted to go last night (I heard).'

The sentence pairs in (41), moreover, show how the different case-infections of the argument Rgya-mtsho can not only differentiate which verb (se or ndzo) is the head of the adverbial modifier k'arnab 'last night' but also indicate whether Rgya-mtsho was the original speaker (41a, where the ergative inflection marks Rgya-mtsho as the agent argument of the verb se) or not (41b).

Next, clues to the categorial status of se are also furnished by the relative word order of se and verbal proclitics, such as the interrogative
marker ə= ⁴⁰ and the negation marker mə= /mə= ⁴¹

(42) (a) kʰo ju =ɛ ə=tʰon=tʰə?
    he(abs) home=dat Q=arrive=dir ev

(a')*kʰo ju=ɛ tʰon ə=tʰə?
    'Did he arrive home?'

(b) kʰo ju =ɛ ma=tʰon =tʰə.
    he(abs) home=dat neg=arrive =dir ev

(b')*kʰo ju =ɛ tʰon ma=tʰə.
    'He didn't arrive home.'

(43) (a) kʰo ndzo go ə= se?
    he(abs) go(incom) want Q= quot

(a')*kʰo ndzo ə=go=se.
    'Did you hear that he wanted to go?'

(b) kʰo ndzo go ma= se.
    he(abs) go(incom) want neg= quot
    'I didn't hear that he wanted to go.'

cf. (b')kʰo ndzo ma= go se.
    he(abs) go(incom) neg= want quot
    'I heard that he didn't want to go.'

*'I didn't hear that he wanted to go.'

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⁴⁰ A salient syntactic difference between Dbus-Gtsang and Western dialects on the one hand and Amdo and Khams dialects on the other is that in the latter dialects yes-no questions are normally indicated by interrogative proclitics rather than sentence-final particles (e.g. ə= in Mdző-dge and Bla-brang 拉卜楞 (Amdo); a%= in Chab-mdo, Sde-dge, and Minyag (Khams); see Gesang 1964; Jin 1958).

⁴¹ The distribution of the negation markers mə= and mə= is determined by both aspect and modality. mə= is used in incompletive contexts, while mə= occurs in completive contexts (as well as in prohibitive sentences).
Verbal proclitics are generally attached to the main verb of the clause which, in a head-final language like Tibetan, occurs toward the end of the verbal complex. We see this ordering exemplified in (42) where the proper host of the proclitics ma= and ə= is the main verb thon ‘to arrive’ rather than the direct evidential enclitic =ṭha. However, the sentences in (43) show that, unlike =ṭha which has become a grammatical element, se retains verbal capacities to the extent that it can still serve as a host to verbal proclitics.

On the other hand, se has undergone important changes and become syntactically very different from ordinary verbs. In short, se suffers from drastic functional reduction. Recall the structure of the duplex quotative dzo =*kə se, in which the first occurrence of the verb of speaking is dzo rather than se. This is causally linked to the fact that se has undergone loss of all free combinability with functional affixes to form various constructions: 42

(44) (a) samndzəb jö̙̊ ng go dži =ṭha dæ, ma jö̙̊ ng =ṭha.
Bsams-'grub come want say(com)=dir ev conj neg come =dir ev
(a')samndzəb jö̙̊ ng go se=ṭha dæ, ma jö̙̊ ng=ṭha.
'Bsams-'grub said he would come, but didn’t.’

(45) (a) mo jö̙̊ ng =a dži =nə kərnaβ təon =ṭha.
she(abs) come =desid say(com) =con last night arrive=dir ev
(a')mo jö̙̊ ng=a se=nə kərnaβ təon=ṭha.
'Having said she would come, she arrived last night.’

(46) (a) gə kəo jö̙̊ ng =ṭha dži =nə gaβag jən.
I(dat) he(abs) come=dir ev say(com)=nom Ngag-dbang cop

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42 What is interesting here is that the extent of functional reduction of the quotative marker is not the same in all Amdo dialects. For instance, the Bla-brang and Thang-skor equivalents of the NdżT duplex quotative are, according to my consultant, se=*kə se and ze=*=kə se, respectively.
(a')*ga k'o jog=\text{t\ae} se=no ga\text{kag} jen.

'The one who told me that he came is Ngag-dbang.'

(47)(a) ma k'o jog =t\ae dzi =nu \eta to she(dat) he(abs) come=dir ev say(com)=nom(gen) person def gae jen.
I(abs) cop

(a')*ma k'o jog=t\ae se=nu \eta to gae jen

'I am the one who told her that he came.'

Note that se can neither be the host of the direct evidential =t\ae (44),
nor can it take the clause connective =nu to form a clause-chain (45), or the
agentive nominalizer =no 43 to form cleft (46) and relative (47) clauses. In
all of the above environments, se has to be supplanted by dzo, which is now
the normal verb of speaking in this language.

To recapitulate, the data at hand indicates that the quotative marker se
has become a 'defective' verb, with most of its erstwhile syntactic functions
 usurped by a competing verb. It appears that se in modern Ndzt occupies a
pre-terminal stage on its way to becoming a fully grammaticalized morpheme.

7.4 The Status of Quotatives in the Ndzt Evidential
System

The quotative morpheme se is, on both categorial and distributional
counts, at variance with the other three evidential markers examined above,
since unlike the latter, se behaves more like an abnormal verb than a clitic
element. This fact per se should however not rule out the quotative marker

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43 Ndzt has three nominalizers: the agentive =no, the non-agentive =dqo, and the
dative-locative-allative =st\text{\ae}wo.
as a true evidential morpheme, for it is quite common for evidentials not to constitute a unitary morphological category in a given language.\(^\text{44}\) Anderson 1986:274-5 provides the following explicit criteria for identifying prototypical grammaticalized evidentials:

(1) It shows the type of justification for the speaker’s factual claim.
(2) Evidentials are not the main predication, but are rather added specifications on the predication.
(3) Evidentials have the indication of evidence as their primary meaning, not just as a pragmatic inference.
(4) Evidentials are part of inflectional rather than derivational morphology.

Judging by all of the preceding criteria, a strong case can be made for the quotatives as legitimate members of the NdżT evidential system. First and foremost is the semantic consideration. The function of the quotative in NdżT is to encode reported evidence, which, together with sensory evidence and inference, are considered to constitute the three major types of evidentials (Willett 1988:54). Moreover, several facts have been presented in the foregoing sections to show that the NdżT quotative constructions have become specialized grammatical devices for conveying information-source rather than propositional content. First, se is not used in quoting common sayings or well-known hearsay, but is a specialized marker of genuine factual claims (see (38) above). Also, the main quotative marker se is no longer an

\(^\text{44}\) For instance in Patwin, a Wintun language spoken in Northern California, the evidential system comprises an auxiliary, a particle, and several suffixes (Whistler 1986).
ordinary verb of saying in the language. Not only has se lost its capacity to combine with other morphological and lexical material, but, more importantly, se is severely restricted syntactically. In my data, se usually occurs in sentence-final position; the only morphemes that can occur after the evidentials in sentences are illocutionary-force particles. If se were meant to encode normal propositional content, its drastic functional and distributional restrictions would be difficult to explain. The inability of se to appear in non-finite clauses (see 45-7 above), I contend, is a direct consequence of its function as an evidential, for, with its scope over the entire sentence, we would expect it to be impossible for a subordinate clause to have evidential marking independent of that of the main clause (cf. Foley and Van Valin 1984:218-20). A final piece of corroborating evidence comes from the diachronic side: the form se itself exhibits exceptional phonological reduction (see section 6 above), which again testifies to the nature of se as a special grammaticalized marker.

8. Summary and Conclusions

We have seen that in informative verbal transactions, NdżT boasts an elaborate evidential system for indexing the factual basis for the speaker’s assertions. The most salient features of this system are recapitulated below.

A major context for evidentially marked speech is when the speaker gives/requests information about what transpired in the past. Here semantic factors determine evidential morpho-syntax in self-person vs. other-person sentences. Evidential contrasts in the former sentence type are more fully developed: default-marking for volitional events, direct evidential marking for non-volitional conscious events, and indirect evidential marking for non-
volitional unconscious events. Fluidity with reference to the default vs. direct evidential marking is also exploited to reflect the perceived degree of control in the reported events.

The primary criterion pertinent to evidentiality in other-person sentences is, on the contrary, whether the reported event is directly perceived by the speaker or not, calling respectively for direct and indirect evidentials. A further measure of the directness of attestation in other-person sentences is observability, which conditions the occurrence of the perfect auxiliary jod. Moreover, when the speaker describes a novel, ongoing situation of which he has no previous knowledge, a unique evidential =kφ is required. Two partially grammaticalized quotative evidentials se and dzɔ= kφ se together mark reported evidence, another important secondary data source.

The NdzT evidential system emerging from our preceding discussions differs in significant ways from the Lhasa system. First of all, one is struck by the almost total lack of cognacy of the evidential forms despite the considerable conceptual commensurability between the two systems. To begin with, unlike in Lhasa, copulas play an inconsequential role in the NdzT evidential system. Most of the major NdzT evidential markers are built instead on clitics. Second, in past situations where Lhasa does employ non-copula evidential markers, the morphemes also have entirely different lexical sources than their NdzT counterparts. While the NdzT indirect evidential =zag does not seem to have any counterpart in the Lhasa system, the latter system also has developed distinctions missing from NdzT, such as the partially lexicalized

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45 This tentative comparison with the Lhasa system is based mainly on DeLancey 1990 and Jin 1979. Desirable as it is, a full-scale contrastive study between the two systems is beyond the scope of this paper.

46 Compare, for instance, the direct evidentials song and byung in Lhasa, and their functional equivalent =taw in NdzT. All of these forms, however, are evolved from OT motion verbs.
'centrifugal' (song) vs. 'centripetal' (byung) distinction in direct evidentials. 47 In addition, for the NdzT auxiliary jod plus the immediate evidential =kṣ, Lhasa has evolved two separate lexicalized forms: 'dug and the perfect bzhag, corresponding respectively to NdzT jod=ṅkṣ and V(com) jod=ṅkṣ. Another important area where NdzT diverges from Lhasa Tibetan concerns the usage of the so-called 'conjunct' forms, which denote, essentially, thoroughly integrated knowledge. Unlike Lhasa, which has a distinct conjunct form =pa yin in the completive aspect, the NdzT equivalent is the default =na marker, which occurs mainly for phonological reasons (e.g. rhythm). The distributions of conjunct forms also differ: in NdzT, they occur only in self-person volitional sentences, while in Lhasa their use is much more flexible. Thus, (48a) below is not a grammatical NdzT sentence for the gloss '(I know very well that) There are yaks in Tibet':

(48)(a) *od nae 蹼 jod.
Tibet loc yak exist (conjunct)

(a')od nae 蹼 jod=na re.
Tibet loc yak exist (declarative)

The correct version (48a'), instead, has to involve the non-evidential declarative construction. On the other hand, the conjunct formulation Bod la g-yag yod is perfectly acceptable in Lhasa (DeLancey 1986:204). 48

47 These terms are from Hu 1984:6; cf. also Tournadre 1991:94-95, Xie 1982:41.
48 This was confirmed by the two speakers of Lhasa Tibetan whom I had a chance to consult during a recent field trip to Tibet (Summer, 1992). According to Jin 1983:10, Lhasa Tibetan can also use the conjunct form =gi yod (cf. NdzT =ṅkṣ jod), instead of =gi 'dug (cf. NdzT =ṅkṣ jod=ṅkṣ) in other-person sentences when the narrator (1) asserts emphatically that the situation can really happen,
In sum, the Lhasa evidential system, with its transparent grammaticalization of the copulas and fluidity of evidential usage, seems to represent a less advanced stage in the grammaticalization of linguistic epistemology than the more rigid and largely opaque NdZT system.

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(2) narrates about something of which he has intimate, personal knowledge, or (3) is the deictic goal of the described event. However, neither Delancey's nor my consultants of Lhasa accept this usage.

49 The N(ew) K(noledge) members of the NK vs. A(ssimilated) K(noledge) contrast in the Lhasa copulas seem to be a secondary development. Whereas all known varieties of Tibetan seem to have the AK copulas (all cognate to the OT equative copula yin and existential copula yod), the NK forms are clearly recent innovations. We have shown that the grammaticalization of the NK existential copula from the OT verb 'dug has not happened at least in the Amdo dialects. The cross-dialectal formal disparity of the NK equative copulas (red in Lhasa, ji" na" in Gongbu, ps?" in Shigatse 日喀则, tc?" in Sherpa, etc.) also demonstrate the secondary status of this member of the distinction even within the Dbus-Gtsang group (Qu et al. 1989:54).
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